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                   «We got rid of Miloević relatively easily, but it is much more difficult to get 
rid of communism»1, may be a summary of what happened in Serbia after the 18th 
members coalition of DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia) took power on the 
Belgrade's  streets from Miloević's regime on October 5, 2002. The DOS leaders have 
promised deep reforms to reintegrate the country into the world community, to recover 
the economy, to establish democracy and to start implementing the rule of law. Two 
years therafter, not only that promises are not at least partly fulfilled, but also the 
comittment to reforms is lacking. New authorities have undergone the illusion that wrong 
was people in power rather than the system. The DOS continued to rule by keeping the 
old system with minor changes, which do not pose its nature into question, and this has 
prevented larger positive policy changes.  
                   In what follows, this is documented in larger policy areas. Priority is given to 
economy, while the state, legal system and politics are covered to lesser degree, just in 




                   After nearly five decades under Titos communism, the nationalistic 
tendencies grow in Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1980-ies that finally led to disintegration of the 
country at the beginning of 1990-ies. Serbia and Montenegro have formed a temporary 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992, after the majority of Yugoslav nations 
has seceded and formed their nation states - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina 
and Macedonia. FRY was dominated by a national-socialist regime of Slobodan 
Miloević that emerged in Serbia. Due to either aggressive or incompetent policies, 
Serbia and FRY came under diplomatic pressure, followed by the comprehensive 
sanctions of the UN (May 1992  November 1995) and the NATO intervention on 
Kosovo in 1999.  GDP fell for more than 50% from 1989 to 1999, and GDP per capita 
slid down from nearly 3,000 USD to 1,200 USD in 1999. From 2000 on, GDP is on rise 
and it is estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 1,800 USD in the midst 
                                                 
1 M. Prokopijevic, in: Rubin, A. 2001.  
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of 2002.2 Industrial production3 was down 75% at the end 1990-ies, foreign debt up to 
12.5bn USD, i.e. equal to the GDP. Cumulative losses in economy in 2000 were 9bn 
USD, while short term debts reached 14bn USD.4 Official unemployment rate was 28%, 
while unofficial unemployment soared to 50% in 1999. Gray economy has created an 
equivalent to 40-50% of GDP. Imports were covered by exports for 78% in 1990 and for 
40% in 2001. Inflation rate moved 40  200% in 1990-ies, with the hyperinflation in 
1992-1993, close to its heights in Germany after the IIWW.  
                   Bad and expensive policies have deprived Miloević of popular support over 
time, and he finally lost federal presidential elections from September 24, 2000. against 
Vojislav Kotunica, representing the coalition of the DOS. Miloevićs hesitation to 
accept electoral results and rumors on his eventual coup forced hundreds of thousands on 
the Belgrade streets, facilitating his demise from power on October 5, 2000. Everything 
seemed to be pink, since on the Serbian parliamentary election, held on December 23, 
2000, the DOS won a huge majority by getting 176 out of 250 seats in the Serbian 
Parliament.  
                   As a result of huge victory of democratic forces, the DOS took over the 
Serbian government on January 22, 2001. Prime minister Zoran Đinđić said, the 
government got the mandate to implement reforms, rather than just to rule.5 He said, it 
is the government of large reforms and energetic actions that adopts strategy of 
attracting foreign investments and that Serbia needs a new deal. Đinđić said, He 
expects large FDI in agriculture, infrastructure and energy sector.6  He promised to solve 
open questions, for example, to establish relationships with Montenegro on the new basis, 
and to fight terrorism in southern Serbia. Đinđić has promised finally to investigate and 
solve the heaviest crimes, killings and kidnapping from Milosevics era, including 
investigation of involvement of state agencies and secret police into larger crimes.7  
                   The expose by Đinđić was  a mixture of false promises and wrong ideas. 
New deal was a bad idea even when invented, and its status should worsen in our age 
                                                 
2 Contrary to IMF, EBRD (2002) estimates GDP per capita to just 1200 euro. 
3 Cf. Raičević & uković (Eds)(2002), Preface, p. 8. Industrial production in June 2002. was down 1.2% 
compared to June 2001. Cf. Dumezić 2002, p. 26. Cf. Table 1.  
4 Cf. Raičević & uković, p. 8.  
5 Đinđić 2001, p. 1.  
6 Ibid, p. 2.  
7 Ibid, p. 1.  
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of globalization. Deep reforms and larger investments are still missing today as they did 
two years ago. None of the political crimes from Miloevićs era was solved, since 
Đinđić took previous police bosses under his personal protection, while the new cases 
emerged. Actually, criminal agencies dominating the state just have changed the boss, by 
relying on Đinđić instead of Miloević, while everything goes as before.  
                   Larger powers, international organizations and democratic forces in general 
have welcomed the demise of Miloević, and as a result of pro-Western, cooperative 
policy of the DOS, the relationships with the outside world have been improved. States, 
foundations and non-market funds provided financial support for Serbia ahead of reforms  
to happen. There were a lot of hopes both inside and outside the country that murky 
period is over and better time ahead. However, this hopes faded away in less than a year 
after changes took place, as it became clear that new authorities do intend to preserve the 





                   The reliance on bureaucratic control over economy practicized by new 
government has prevented economic reforms. Even there where some modest reforms 
were conducted, they were either insufficient or went into wrong direction. By 
prolonging the rule of bureaucracy over economy the government consolidated the 
redistribution of poverty instead to trace a path to a flourishing market economy able to 
grow at a faster pace.  
 
LIBERALIZATION OF THE TRADE REGIME  
 
                   Foreign trade was during the whole period of Miloevićs rule under the strict 
control, since it was an important source of budget revenues as well as an extra source of 
profits for a small Miloevićs "elite". After changes from October 5th,  there was trade 
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liberalization to some extent. It consisted mainly in liberalization of formal procedures  
(that even previously were not always enforced) and nominal decrease of customs rates.  
            Insofar conducted liberalization measures include:  
 - Abolishment of several requirements for doing business in foreign trade, such 
as: additional registration at the court for the export/import licenses, giving deposit of 
10,000 DEM, paying fixed yearly tax of 20,000 YUD, requirement for having more than 
3 employees. Thus a majority of the formal entry barriers is removed8, which ended the 
practice of indirect import through those companies that were privileged to pass a very 
biased registration procedure.  
 - Since June 1, 2001, the new Law on Customs Tariff is in power, and it brought 
many new propositions:  
 1. The Customs tariff is harmonized with the EU Combined nomenclature.  
 2. Tax for customs' notification was cut from 1% to 0.5%. 
 3. Unique custom rate was cut from 15% to 10% (this rate applies for goods for 
personal and household use, provided their value is lower than 3,000 USD).  
 4. Custom rates are varying between 1% and 30%. There are only 6 categories of 
rates within this range, whilst previously there were 38 different rates (in range between 0 
and 40%).  
 5. For raw material,  equipment and spare parts that can not be sourced from 
Yugoslavia, the custom rate is 1%. If raw material is produced in the country, the rate is 
5%, and for equipment in that case it is 10%. 
 6. The average custom rate has dropped from 14.43% in 2000, to 9.37% in 2001.9  
 7. Some 50.16% of the goods listed undergo the minimum rates set at one and 
five per cent, for 73.17% of goods applied rates are between 1 and 10%, and 7.6% of 
goods listed fall into the maximal, 30% - custom category.  
 8. Customs rates are lowered for 7,099 tariff positions, for 1,116 positions the 
rates remained the same, and for 330 positions the rates are increased.  
                                                 
8 One can frequently read in newspapers that some of the informal restrictions are still in power, thus it can 
be found even the price for license to import one truck of some of the most profitable goods.  
9 It will be most probably the same in 2002 if the structure of imports remains the same, since this rate uses 
as ponders quantities of imported goods.  
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 9. Import licenses are still necessary for import of weapons, drugs and for some 
products of metal industry (since it is expected that Russian producers would enter the 
market with dumping prices).  
                   FRY has recently established several bilateral free trade agreements, of which 
only two are now in power  with Russia and Macedonia. Interim Agreements are signed 
with Bosnia and Hungary. According to the SEE Stability Pact all countries in the region 
are obliged to liberalize trade throughout the region. Due to bilateral free trade 
agreements there are cases of re-export; thus Serbia pays the rent to Russian and 
Macedonian traders for goods coming from the countries with which they have free trade 
agreements. These rents can be lowered if Serbia continues its liberalization and if it 
arranges more free trade agreements. In January 2001, FRY has applied for membership 
in the WTO. In February 2001, it was formed the Working group, and by the end of 2001 
the Group has finished a Memorandum on Yugoslav foreign trade. Since nothing else 
was done, it is unlikely that FRY will enter the WTO before 2005.  
                   All noted measures of trade liberalization and changes done in supporting 
areas, though encouraging, are insufficient. The following is to illustrate that: 
                   1. There is still too large regulation over this sector as well as too many 
restrictions that are mainly formulated through various decisions and decrees, thus 
harming basic rules set by laws, which brought certain liberalization.10 Other regulations 
on foreign trade include: 8 decisions, 4 decrees, 2 orders, and 4 other decisions of lower 
governing levels.  
                   2. Restrictions that are still in power are much higher not only compared to 
that in the EU, but also to those in the neighboring countries (especially for agricultural 
products, food, metal products and cars). For example, average custom rates in some  
transition countries are: Hungary 3.6%, Czech Republic 2.3%, Poland 3.7%, Slovenia 
8.8%, Estonia 0%.  There are also some quantitative restrains in export. Export quotas are 
implemented for 34 products, among them the most important are wheat, corn, sunflower 
seed and  cows. Federal Government decides about the use of quotas and the licenses  
                                                 
10 Foreign trade regime is mainly defined by the following laws: Foreign Trade Law, Customs Law, Law 
on Foreign Currency Transactions, Law on International Credits, Law on excise duty, Law on Retail Tax, 
Law on Tax for Financial Transactions, Law on Fund for Insurance and Finance of Foreign Trade, 
Concessions Law, Law on Free Trade Zones, Law on Foreign Direct Investments etc. 
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are issued by Federal Ministry for international economic relations. Government has 
introduced monopoly on oil imports and a similar monopoly regulation will be applied to 
tobacco.  
                   3. The administration has reduced its presence in foreign trade sector, but it 
kept most of the instruments for controlling those involved in this business, and how 
businesses are going on  thus decreasing competition, making space for corruption and 
finally raising the costs to businesses.  
                   4. Slow pace in reforming the administration (mainly the Federal, which has 
the most of the competences in foreign trade) keeps informal restrictions over this sector, 
supported by the import/export lobbies. Lobbies from Milosevics era found well 
connections with the DOS politicians, which is unacceptable for a functional market 
democracy. 
        5. Despite a nominal decrease of average customs duties, the real customs 
have increased, since the calculated duties must be paid in total amount. The calculated 
duties under previous regime were lower even for 80%, by using official exchange rate 
that was several times below the market rate.  
                   After all these changes there are some positive trends in foreign trade sector 
but still it is needed a further deregulation as well as a decrease of influence of informal 
groups and corruption. There are still a lot of problems: illegal imports (mainly from 
Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and from Montenegro), corruption in administration, 
especially within customs authorities, and policy of exchange rate. Naturally, import-
export business largely depends on general conditions for doing business and ability for 
producing marketable products.  
 



















Export 5816 2539 2677 2858 1498 1723 1903 156 1199 
Import 7460 3859 4826 4849 3296 3711 4837 424 3227 
Trade balance -1644 -1320 -2149 -1991 -1728 -1988 -2934 -268 -2028 
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Import coverage by 
export in % 
78 65,6 55,6 58,8 45,4 54,3 39,3 36,9 36,3 
Source: Ekonomist magazin, no 120, September 9, 2002, p. 6.  
 
                   There was a permanent increase of trade deficit during the 1990-ies, the 
import coverage by export has dropped from 78% to 36,3%. Insofar the trade deficit is  
mainly financed by large inflow of private transfers.11 Constrains for foreign trade are not 
only non-adequate products, but also the lack of knowledge about the procedures, 
financial techniques, international regulation, etc. Growing trade deficit will increase the 
pressure on current macroeconomic balance and exchange rate. Macroeconomic balance 
and exchange rate will be under a strong pressure because of the lack of reforms in the 
real sector. It is realistic to assume that current equilibrium on macro level will be harmed 
in the coming period, most probably between 2004 and 2006, and that might produce a 
crises like in Bulgaria in 1996. In other words, the macroeconomic stability achieved now 




 After the change from October 2000, it took more than six months, until June 
2001, for the new government to legislate the privatization law. That is a long period 
keeping in mind the facts that Serbia is lagging behind the other transition countries and 
that some political parties now belonging to the DOS drafted their own proposal back in 
199512. That shows that the Serbian Government was not in a rush for reforms and once 
the law was introduced it turned out to be bad. The selected method of privatization is 
based on sale of the most of capital through tenders and auctions (up to 70% of the 
value), free distribution of the remaining part of the ownership (the 30% of the value) and 
the restructuring of the enterprises for which it is believed that they could not be sold in 
the present form. The entire concept is formally based on transparency and public 
                                                 
11 Serbian citizens working abroad support financially their relatives in Serbia.  
12 »The proposal of the privatization law« of the Democratic party based on the voucher method was 
submitted to the Parliament of Serbia on March 24, 1995 (and was rejected by ruling Miloević's 
socialists).  
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competition and, what is important for privatization, its premises are compulsiveness and 
limited duration  all publicly owned enterprises are to be privatized within four years 
(until June 2005). 
 The privatization law is bad because the chosen method of privatization 
presupposes the wide openness of the market, a very developed financial market and high 
level of competition, which is not the case in Serbia. If the market is closed one can rely 
on domestic potential buyers only; if the financial market is not developed then the 
bureaucratic arbitration is predominant; if there is no high level of competition, then the 
sale of enterprises turns into the sale of the market. As there is no efficient anti-monopoly 
law in Serbia, companies  get extra rents at the expense of helpless buyers. The law 
unnecessarily centralizes the process of privatization. Instead of the taking care of about 
one hundred largest companies and putting everything else into the hands of the local 
municipalities, the cities (Belgrade, Ni, Novi Sad and Kragujevac) and the province 
Vojvodina, the Government of Serbia took the responsibility for privatization of all 6000 
medium and large companies, in obvious effort to control unemployment and to use the 
revenues from privatization to finance its own stay in power.13 In order to conduct the 
privatization, the Government founded the Agency for privatization, which, in spite of its 
good will, can not complete the privatization of such a large number of enterprises until  
2005, which is the deadline envisaged by the law. 
 The Agency prepares the enterprises for privatization, undertakes their 
privatization and controls the process of privatization. That represents the conflict of 
interests and recalls in advance the proclaimed transparency of the process. At the very 
beginning of the privatization process the Government and the Agency were making 
naïve mistakes, as if they have learned nothing from privatization in other countries. For 
example, the Government envisaged the period of 45 days from the day the auction was 
announced (for the minority package of ownership) and a 15-day deadline for the 
payment of a deposit before the auction; then, if no one would pay the deposit, the 
Government would wait for the day of the auction to announce a new auction, which 
altogether is a waste of time. The Government was pushing for the overestimated value 
                                                 
13 Only 5% of the revenues goes to a municipality or to a province, 5% goes to the pension fund, 5% in the 
restitution fund, while the rest goes to the Serbian budget.  
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of the companies in order to maximize its budgetary revenues.14 The buyers were 
compelled into practices not proper to market economy, such as the obligation of having 
a business plan15 or the obligation to invest 150% of the redemption value of the 
company.  
                   The law on privatization envisaged many exceptions, and the following 
categories do not belong to the privatization scheme: 1. companies belonging to the ex-
Yugoslav republics; 2. bankrupted companies; 3. public communal companies;16  4. 
farmers cooperatives; 5. the high-quality companies. However, the Government does not 
exclude from privatization companies subject to denationalization (restitution). The 
exclusion is awarded only in occasions when The League for the protection of private 
property manages to prevent those sales through its immediate actions, such as  in the 
cases of some hotels in Belgrade and Vrnjačka Banja.17 Although the return of the 
acquired property was very high on the DOSs electoral agenda in 2000, the Government 
of Serbia does not even mention the question of denationalization now.18 Officially, 5% 
of revenues from sold companies go into a fund which is to be used for the redemption of 
                                                 
14 An auction starts with a basic price, equal to 80% of the estimated value of the enterprise, with the public 
sale towards the higher price. If no one shows interest in a particular enterprise the public sale goes 
downwards, with the basic price starting from 120% of the estimated value of the enterprise. If only one 
buyer appears, he is obliged to accept 80% of the estimated value as the price. The buyers have therefore 
arranged to come at least in pairs and than try to pay as low price as possible for the enterprise by bidding 
the price downwards, often paying the deposit only, which was close to one third of the 80% estimated 
value. The authorities changed the rules in July 2002: the basic price is equal to 20% of the estimated value 
and the deposit is »somewhat smaller than that«. The value of the enterprise is determined by discounting 
the net loss of the enterprise from the accounting value of the enterprise and only the upward price biding is 
permitted. 
15 The business plan was no more an obligation in mid-2002, but the redemption value remained. 
16 Some 11% of total employed workforce in the economy works in publicly owned companies and those 
companies create 20% of the GDP, but their losses make 27% of the total losses in the economy. 
Communal companies are only one part of the public companies, but they are also the biggest losers and 
the biggest debtors to the state (because of unpaid taxes). The Government, still, keeps using these 
companies for its social policy, the same as Miloević and Tito did before. The minister of finance in the 
Government of Serbia, Bozidar Đelić, says that the state should invest 27bn USD into these companies by 
2010. Cf. L.S. (2002), p. 16.  Only a person who does not know what the money is could say such a thing.  
17 So the Government of Serbia sold the cement-production factory in Beočin, although that factory was 
nationalized by the Tito's communists after 1945. In Belgrade there are open sales of the city building 
ground which was also nationalized after 1945, although the inheritors of the former owners protested, and 
in one case the American embassy in Belgrade protested as a legal representative of one former owner, now 
the U.S. citizen.  
18 It is ironical that the Government of Serbia allowed the ancestors of the former royal family 
Karađorđević to move into the White Court residence, where the previous inhabitants were Tito and 
Miloević, but by making them pay a monthly rent to the city of Belgrade rather than returning them back 
their property. Of course, it would be unjustified to give back the property to Karađorđević family without 
giving the property back to the other ex-owners, too. 
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the ex-owners, which is far away from the market value. Except for that, further delay of 
the denationalization of arable land and firms negatively affects the productivity of its 
use. 
 In the first 15 months of privatization very few companies were privatized, three 
of them through public tenders (keeping in mind that the earlier partial privatization of 
the Beočin cement factory was only confirmed through this concept) and a few dozen of 
other companies through auctions.19 In that light, the remark of the EBRD sounds a bit 
grotesque: The most impressive achievements include highly practical and deal-
orientated privatization law  and the introduction of a foreign investment law which 
underlines the essentially equal status of foreign and domestic investors.20    
                   Basic reasons behind a flawed privatization law and at the same time the 
deficiencies of the concept could be found in the following: 
        1. Maladjustment of the concept with the current business environment. The concept 
is based on direct investments, mostly foreign, because of the low level of domestic 
savings and low purchasing power of domestic capital. Private investment requires high 
stability and a foreseeable business environment, low political and above all low 
economic risk, stable institutions and the guarantees of the property rights. There is no 
such an environment in Serbia at the moment, and more importantly, the signals that the 
overall condition is to improve soon are very weak. The proof that the business 
environment in Serbia is unfavorable for privatization as such is the low level of FDI last 
year. 
        2. Complex procedures and over-bureaucratization of the process. The procedure for 
auction sales (applied to small and medium enterprises) is far simpler than the one 
through tenders, it lasts at least several weeks (from the initiation, over the production of 
the prospectus of the enterprise, value estimation, public announcement, till the very 
auction). The Agency for privatization represents a narrow bridge of the entire process, 
because as efficient as it can be, only one bureaucratic device can not complete such a 
                                                 
19 The Government claims that about 350 enterprises are in privatization process, and according to its 
program 1000 enterprises should be sold in 2002. It is unclear how the Government would achieve that if it 
sold no more than 40 enterprises by September 2002.  
20 EBRD 2002, p. 10.  
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large task within the given deadline (privatization of around 6000 companies). The 
Agency is unable to respond to all those requests. 
        3. Non-transparency of the tender procedure.  In all developed market economies the 
decision about the best offer at a public tender is brought according to one criterion only 
 the price offered by the bidders. Tender sale in Serbia presupposes the existence of four 
mutually incomparable criteria  the transaction price, social program, investment 
program and the environmental program. This method makes impossible the comparison 
of the bids, it is partly used to buy the social peace, and the state shows that it is still 
incapable to accept the social function and tries to transfer one part of its social 
responsibility to new owners. Incomparability of offers leaves wide discretionary power 
to the tender committee and opens the space for corruption. 
        4. Low demand of investors for domestic companies. This problem is usually quoted 
as the biggest obstacle to privatization based on sale, but as one can observe, in the 
Serbian concept there are even bigger deficiencies. From about 6000 companies which 
are to be privatized, according to the minister for privatization some 4000 will have to be 
liquidated, since they are bankrupted for longer. 
 
                   The process of privatization is too slow and it is hard to expect its end within 
the planned deadline of four years. In an effort to enlarge the number of auction sales in 
July 2002, the Government - appealing for patriotism in the purchase of enterprises and 
using administrative measures  has invited local authorities from all 140 municipalities  
to turn in their lists of several local companies perceived as appropriate for privatization 
through auction. Instead of these illogical and uneconomic attempts the Government 
should undertake the following: 
        1. To improve the rule of law and business environment. Many important laws, 
which were supposed to be introduced a long time ago, are still far away from being 
brought into the parliamentary procedure. It is necessary to diminish the economic risks 
and administration in the entire economic system, which is directed towards the creation 
of more favorable conditions for investments. Faster reform of the banking system and 
the development of the capital markets are also necessary conditions for a more efficient 
privatization.  
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        2. Privatization of the process of privatization. It is necessary to allow to private 
agencies (consultant offices, lawyers offices, banks) to handle privatizations, and to 
allow firms to choose the agencies which would help them in the privatization process. 
        3. Denationalization. It is necessary to define as soon as possible the ownership 
over the companies, in other words  to create the legal basis for the redemption of ex-
owners. From the aspect of privatization, it does not matter which method will be 
chosen, what matters is how fast the procedure would be and how quickly the legal 
regulation in this field would be introduced. The Government not only missed to make 
any positive move in this field, but it also made some completely opposite moves 
equivalent to nationalization  such as introducing its control over two dozen of banks, 
over Mobtel, a private telecommunication company, and messing with the business of 
ICN Galenika, a privately owned pharmaceutical giant.  
   
MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
 
                   Markets were to some extent more liberal during Miloević era compared to 
1980-ies, but the number of restrictions and the level of government interventions on the 
market were very large. The government has controlled either directly or indirectly two 
thirds of all prices during Miloevićs rule. Prices of life necessities, such as electricity, 
bread, utilities, were far below the market level, and that has caused frequent shortages, 
rationing and queues. Beside directly controlled prices, some prices were under the 
special regime  companies were able to change the prices but only with prior 
Government approval. Just a part of prices were freely defined on the market. 
Immediately after the loss of presidential elections in September 2000, Miloevićs  
government started price liberalization anticipating its soon downfall, thus wanting to 
inspire a larger social conflict that might be instrumental for its eventual political come-
back. That plan failed and the new government continued with liberalization. Gradually 
price control was abolished for the most products, but some forms of control still exist 
even two years later. This control is regulated both by Federal law on system of social 
price control, and by the Serbian law on public control of prices. Some of the measures  
for price control are permanent (bread and milk) and others are introduced occasionally 
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due to some special situations  one of them being, if plans defined on the federal or 
republic level are under question. Price control is still partially used as a tool for social 
care policy, especially for utilities.  
                   Market is regulated by many laws, directives, decrees, etc. that restrict 
transactions to some larger extent. There are many examples of subsidizes, monopolies21 
(cartels), high levels of customs duties, hard entry possibilities, complicated procedures 
for doing business, unprotected contracts (thus contracting parties are pressured to 
enforce contracts privately). In order to approach the market economy it is necessary to 
continue liberalization, to enforce all voluntarily agreed contracts, to promote 
competition in all segments of the economy.  
                   In agriculture, as one of the most regulated sectors, are to be abolished: 1. 
guaranteed prices, 2. parity system, 3. control of profit margins in trade sector, 4. direct 
control of basic life products. The state has to reduce the number of goods that are 
usually bought for state reserves. It is also needed to reduce subsidies and to open the 
market for agricultural products. Although "green market" is the most marketable part of 
agriculture, prices there are still much higher than in neighboring countries. Farmers are 
protected from foreign competition and some agro-industrial products are even 
monopolized (cartelized). Thus, some basic products in Serbia are more expensive 
compared not only to other transitional countries, but also to the EU. For example, 
sunflower oil costs 0.4  0.6 Euro in the EU, and 1.2  1.3 Euro in Serbia.  
                   Government directly controls the price of utilities. This sector is excluded 
from the privatization and it is still misused for social policy. Companies in this sector are 
monopolists with high level of inefficiency  high prices and low level of services. As an 
example of the current situation in this sector Public electricity company employs 
67,000 employees, though less than a half of this number is sufficient for normal 
operation. There are still no debates on the privatization of this sector and on introduction 
of competition in production and distribution of electricity.  
                   Car industry with 10,000 employees produces about just a few thousands cars 
a year, but it is protected with custom duties of 20%. Other than important direct 
                                                 
21 Since 1997 there is formally anti-monopoly law and commission, but the law is not enforced. Moreover, 
some new monopolies are introduced like in telecommunications, tobacco and oil business. 
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interventions on the market, the government has monopolized the import of oil, while 
drafted versions of laws on tobacco and lottery suggest similar moves.22 
                   The Serbian Government demonstrates its reluctance to market solutions by 
adopting "decree on special terms for import, production and distribution of oil and its 
derivates" on March 2001, since the Government took complete monopoly on all of these 
operations. Oil may be imported only by the companies that have their own capacities for 
processing the oil (article 2) and the only company that fulfills this is the Serbian Oil 
Industry (NIS) that is state owned. This is not a necessary move, since the other potential 
importers can enter the business just if they make a contract with the only producer of the 
oil (NIS). This provides the space for corruption since the management of NIS can 
require some extra fees in order to agree with the contract. Other chance for corruption is 
left by the decision that Government and its commission are responsible for making 
decisions for overall import of oil thus looking for provisions for buying the oil at the 
international market.23 The transit of crude oil is restricted to river transportation; thus the 
government imposes restrictions on transportation of oil by foreign companies. Oil 
processor can sell the oil only to the companies that are registered for trading with oil,  
pushing this market back to socialist system of licensing. Finally, penalties for any 
misuse are very high, moving between 300,000 and 3m YUD (4,840  48,400 USD).  
                   Instead of overcoming problem of black market and tax evasion by 
encouraging the competition among importers, processors and distributors, the 
government decided to introduce monopoly, by promoting "entrepreneurial" function of 
the state, providing thus a large space for arbitration and corruption. Moreover this is 
wrong signal that etatism is growing instead of declining. By building the state 
monopoly, the government also prevents investment in the sector, thus harming its further 
development.  
                   According to the draft on the Tobacco law, trading with tobacco products is 
monopolized by the state, and handled by the newly established Agency for Tobacco. 
                                                 
22 In order to save some space, we recommend the analyzes of the previous draft version of the Lottery Law 
(Tasic, 2001). After public criticisms, government made new draft version of the law (it can be found on 
www.mfin.sr.gov.yu), for which is hardly to say that it is better than the previous one.  
23 Crude oil was never traded on the black market so the state monopoly is a reflection of some ministries 
intention to get bribed from foreign wholesalers.  
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Does this mean that in the close future we can expect establishment of Agencies for cars, 
spirits, carpets or chocolates?  
                   Agency for tobacco will issue the licenses for doing business in tobacco 
production, wholesale and retail trade, and it will also monitor the trends on the tobacco 
market. Authors of this draft law claim that this will provide transparency in issuing the 
licenses, but it is not clear what would be the guaranties for that and what would be the 
penalty for failure. Agency organizes public tenders for issuing licenses for production of 
tobacco products "taking into account the tax priorities, market conditions and previously 
accepted commitments of the country in this field."24 This implies that agency will take 
decisions if the budget needs more revenues from the tobacco producers and if the 
number of producers is sufficient. Some among declared conditions for tenders are 
unusual, since they require that producers: 1) have their own capacities for production of 
at least 2.5bn cigarettes per year  thus government knows better than producers what 
quantities should be produced; 2) are obliged to buy domestic brands of tobacco, at least 
2000 tones per year  no matter what is the demand for domestic tobacco, or tobacco of 
that particular category; 3) offer the realist estimate of the fulfillment of the planed 
production of tobacco, specified in quality and quantity  that means that it is assumed 
that one may enter the tobacco market accidentally, and the government will decide 
weather its production is realistic.  
                   While issuing licenses for wholesale, there are some conditions just to 
employ the administration, and the result is the increase in costs of doing business, 
restriction for competition and consequently increasing the retail prices. The license alone 
for doing business in wholesale costs 5m YUD for 5 years. In order to obtain it, 
companies are required to bring the proof that they have deposited this amount in some 
Yugoslav bank, or to provide bank guaranty on 30m YUD. This deposit is used for 
reserve and eventually for forced payment, if the company violates the contract with the 
state.  Producers and wholesalers are also obliged to recommend retail prices. The 
Agency for tobacco issues permission for operation to retail sales. Retail stores are 
obliged to fulfill several conditions and to pay in advance 50 USD for every year in 
                                                 
24 Draft version of the Tobacco Law, Ministry of Finances, www.mfin.sr.gov.yu  
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which they sell tobacco. Above all,  they are obliged to expose at the very visible place 
the vignette symbolizing permission for trade, issued by the state.  
 
     BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT AND START UP BUSINESSES  
 
 Start up businesses are even more important for the economic success of a 
transition process than quick and efficient privatization. In that respect Serbia failed 
completely, which can be illustrated by the following data: in 2001 no more than 3000 
new enterprises were established, 330 out of which were with foreign or mixed 
ownership, whereas in 1990 in former SFRY more than 150,000 enterprises were created, 
1/3 out of which was in Serbia & Montenegro (in other words  50,000 new enterprises 
in one year).  FDIs were irrelevantly small  40m USD in 2001, excluding the sales of 
cement-production factories.25  
 Serbia will remain a bad business environment until decisive and precise steps are 
made with regard to some crucial things deteriorating the business climate. 
 First, bad, irregular and incomplete land-register. Many buildings are not even in 
cadastral register, which makes both privatization and the transfer of real estate much 
more difficult. To foreign citizens is not allowed to buy land in Serbia and therefore they 
are not entitled to own even the land which they would use to build their offices and 
businesses: one can not own the ground planned for construction of the buildings, one 
can only get the right to use it. What is even worse, that right of use could not be sold to 
another person (if one, for example, gives up his building plans), it could only be returned 
to the state. It is strange that the officials in Serbia expect from someone to invest in the 
country where he/she is not even allowed to own a piece of ground upon which he would 
build his own business buildings. 
 Second, a complicated procedure for start ups, taxation and management. The 
procedure for start up businesses is desperately long, complicated and demanding. A 
large number of papers, documents and requests is needed (around 35 different papers 
and it roughly lasts 105 days)26, which are to be submitted to the commercial court, 
                                                 
25 Their sale enlarged public revenues for additional 130m USD.  
26 »Cost of doing business in Serbia«, p. 19.  
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statistics and Clearing and Payment Office (ZOP), just to register an enterprise. With all 
that complexity the process is also very expensive, because the minimum capital needed 
is 5,000-10,000 USD, depending on the form of the newly-established enterprise. Except 
that, there are also high formal and informal costs for the speeding up of the procedure 
(various taxes, papers and corruption, too).27 At the beginning of registration process one 
has to quote consecutively all kinds of future activities of that particular enterprise and to 
submit the evidence that the technical conditions for doing those activities are fulfilled. 
After registration, one needs to go through the process of acquiring the infrastructural 
connections (electricity, telephone, water supply), which can also be long lasting and 
very costly. Getting the telephone connection is the most simple and the quickest of all 
three, it only requires a few essential documents about the creation of the enterprise and 
about the right of ownership, i.e. use of offices for which the connections are required. 
The lack of sufficient number of connections, caused by the monopolistic position of the 
Telekom, is the most frequently solved through corruption. Acquiring an electro-
energetic connection is a lot more complicated. One needs at first an electro-energetic 
authorization, which means an important paper work, and then it follows a report about 
the fulfillment of technical conditions, which also encompasses unnecessary bureaucracy 
of the EPS-system. The hardest of all is, after the fulfillment of all preconditions, to 
actually get a connection  because of the insufficient technical capacities of the public 
company Elektroprivreda Srbije. New problems arise if one erects a new building. 
Acquiring city-planning and building permits requires more than thirty different permits 
and papers from a dozen of institutions and lasts more than half a year. Another blow to 
business is that the judicial system in Serbia is very inefficient and slow. The processes 
are lengthy, efficiency is low and the level of corruption is very high. On the top of all 
that, one ought to add the fact that, because of the system which protects the debtor 
instead of the creditor, a lot of credits are paid through the judicial enforcements, which 
additionally slows down the business cycles of enterprises. 
                                                 
27 According to the research of G17 Institute »Cost of doing business in Serbia«, p. 20, those costs go up to 
4,000 USD and the procedure of starting up a business lasts from 16 to 71 day; 16 days are needed i f one 
bribes the state employees and 71 days are needed i f there's no bribe. That is an average time calculat ed 
after 5% of extreme cases were discarded (i.e. 5% of the fastest and the slowest). 
 21 
 A big problem arises if an enterprise wants to change the branch, or to widen its 
scope of business activities. The procedure encompasses a new collection of evidences  
about technical equipment, preregistration at the court and the statistics and acquisition of 
codes for new activities.  
 Third, there is still no bankruptcy law in Serbia, but only a law on insolvency. In 
practice, that means one could get credits, liquidate the enterprise and open another one 
anew, without paying back the earlier credits.  
 Fourth, the commercial law is restrictive and bad,28 a new one is still to be 
introduced and in that sense nothing was done so far. Auditors reports are nor reliable at 
all and nobody in Serbia takes them seriously; it is widely believed that a desirable 
auditing report is easy to get against money compensation.  
 Fifth, regulation of the businesses is large and constantly changing. As the reform 
of the system of public administration is the lengthiest and hardest part of the transition 
process, it is deemed suitable to accept the institution of silent administration29, as it 
was done in some of the neighboring countries (Croatia, Hungary). That means, if the 
administration does not respond within the envisaged deadline (which has to be a lot 
shorter than the present 60 days  in Croatia it is 22 papers and 14 days of deadline), one 
presupposes that the enterprise has received a registration permit. It is worth mentioning 
that the procedure of enterprise registration in Canada, whose economy is not among the 
most liberal ones, lasts up to two days and costs 280 Canadian dollars.30 
 Sixth, discouraging macroeconomic environment. The exchange rate of dinar is  
relatively stable, dinar is informally tied to the Euro, and the question is for how long this 
relative stability will last. Inflation is now lower than before 2001, but it is still high and 
too unpredictable for normal monetary standards31. High economic risks require high 
                                                 
28 Existing commercial law is based on completely wrong principles  granting privileges to 1) debtors over 
creditors, 2) state owned over private sector, 3) domestic over foreign businessmen, 4) employees over 
owners. 
29 »Silent administration« in Serbia does exist in the case when one needs a connection to the electricity 
system, but it has a completely inverse meaning: the lack of response means the refusal rather than 
acceptance.  
30 S. Djankov, R. De La Porta, F. Lopez de Salinas, A. Shleifer, »The regulation of entry«, Third Draft, 
June 2001.  
31 The offici als of the NBY and the Serbian Government at the end of 2001 predicted the rate of inflation of 
up to 25% for the entire 2002. After the publication of statistical data on the rate of infl ation in January and 
February 2002 the offi cials said that the inflation in 2002 would be up to 15%, and in June 2002 the 
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interest rates, which additionally discourage new investments (interest rate on the credits 
denominated in Euro is between 1.5 and 2.5% a month and 9-15% a year). It is worth 
mentioning that there is almost no bank ready to give credits denominated in dinars  
without the foreign-exchange clause, which tells enough about a very low level of 
confidence in domestic currency. The existence of monopolistic state structures (oil,  
tobacco) is a very important psychological momentum above all, because it is a clear 
signal to potential investors that the state is ready to do anything in order to enlarge its 
budget.  
 Seventh, enormous taxes and high level of state expenditures (see the part of this 
study on taxation). 
 Eight, the market of Serbia is small and undeveloped, so one can not expect that 
foreign companies would enter it just because they count on the future potential of the 
market, as they would do in Poland or Ukraine, nor one may expect that the market 
would be sufficiently liberalized soon to enable doing business in a normal way. 
 Ninth, apart from economic risks, political and security risks are quite big, too. 
All of the previously mentioned items enlarge the risks for doing business, and the bigger 
the risk, the higher the price of money. That way, the credits become too expensive for 
most of the average profitable businesses, so that the total number of transactions is  
relatively small, but the interest rates can not be lower until the risks diminish, too. 
 Even before the change of the regime took place in Serbia, it was evident that the 
business environment is very bad, which was documented by many short elaborates and 
opinions of experts and especially emphasized by the study Cost of doing business in 
Serbia in early 2002. Only after that, when everything was more than clear, the 
governments of Serbia and the FRY came up with their claims that there obviously exist 
numerous obstacles for doing business, which are to be investigated. Therefore, the 
Ministry for international economic relations of the Government of Serbia made a study 
in June 2002 about the business environment and stated the well known fact  that it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
offi cials of the NBY prognosed the yearly rate of inflation of up to 9%. After the price of electricity 
increased in July 2002 and the rate of inflation suddenly went upwards, the offi cials are now predicting the 
rate of infl ation of around 15%, while Miroljub Labus, deputy prime-minister of the FRY predicts the rate 
of around 20%. Labus: Yugoslavia in the EU maybe by 2010, Danas, July 16, 2002.  
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bad. To realize where those problems are one does  not need to spend 18 months in 
power32 and to conduct additional studies. 
 Instead of doing the only thing a state should do in a market economy  
establishing the rule of law and solid rules of the game  the Government of Serbia did 
everything else but that. That government did not got the message that the prosperity 
cannot be achieved by political means, so it has tried to use exactly the political means to 
achieve something, not even realizing that by doing that it only prolongs the practice of 
socialism.33  
 For example, immediately after seizing power the Government has organized the 
meetings with foreign businessmen, invited for several times the ethnic Serbs  
successfully working and living abroad, and organized the meetings with the chambers of 
commerce of certain countries (Italy, Germany, Austria, USA). Government 
representatives traveled into large multinationals (Siemens, Microsoft) or brought them to 
Belgrade, organized the associations of foreign investors34 in Belgrade and did many 
other unnecessary things with only one purpose  to attract foreign investments to Serbia. 
According to the newspapers reports a Business council of the Diaspora was formed in 
Belgrade on June 21, 2002, and in late July a six-bank consortium was formed with a 
fund of 60m Euro dedicated to credit domestic entrepreneurs willing to buy small and 
medium enterprises (if they would really want to buy them, they would have done that 
already by now).35 Of course, the result of all those moves of the Government is equal to 
                                                 
32 Some ministries in the Serbian Government have not noticed until June 2002  after one year and a hal f 
spent in power  that there were serious obstacles for doing business in Serbia. Some problems among 
those quoted here were identi fied and the question is what the government will do now to resolve them. 
Before the Government of Serbia, the G17 Institute made a study »Cost of doing business in Serbia« in the 
spring of 2002 in which the existing conditions were identified, but no solutions were proposed, so another 
research of the ministries of the Serbian Government was not necessary.   
33 Therefore, Dimitrije Boarov, a well-known journalist, rightly said for the members of the Government 
that  they say they were educat ed in the West, but they think and work as if they have just arrived from 
Moscow.  
34 Initiation of the »Council of foreign investors« in mid-July 2002 was nothing but another desperat e move 
of the Government of Serbia. The Council is supposed to investigate what prevents foreign investments in 
Serbia, as if that is not widely known already. The Council members are: British American Tobacco, Bull 
Yugoslavia, Holcim, HVB Yugoslavia, Hyatt Regency, Mercedes Benz, OMV, Price Waterhouse & 
Coopers, Siemens, Societe Generale, Tehnogas, Tetra Pak and Velux.  
35 The consortium members are AIK, Vojvodjanska bank, Delta Raiffeisen, HVB Bank and Jugobanka. 
Foreign companies are often forced to support this kind of Government moves in order to survive at the 
market. The funds given for this purpose can be treated as an informal tax. Refusal of these initiatives 
would lead to the use of Government discretionary powers against such companies, which would be a lot 
more expensive for the companies. 
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zero, because (foreign) investors do not come when the Government invites them or 
when not even the domestic investors are willing to invest, but when the conditions for 
investing and doing business in an environment are favorable. The situation can be well 
illustrated by a statement of one Austrian banker, operating in Belgrade: I am in 
constant touch with the German companies willing to invest here, but when I explain 





 Market reforms are impossible without the reform of the labor market. The aims 
which are to be achieved are the following: creation of the preconditions for wages and 
labor adjustment, induction of the labor demand which is the only way to decrease the 
existing mass-uneployment, improval of the efficiency in the use of this resource in order 
to increase the overall economic efficiency. Flexibility of the labor market requires a 
simplification of the hiring and firing process, or in other words  the creation of such 
formal preconditions  which would enable the entrepreneurs to adjust the level of 
employment according to the entrepreneurial calculation without a large cost. Solutions 
offered by the Labor law35 go along this way. The employment procedure is simplified in 
comparison to the earlier practice. There is no legal obligation to perform the 
employment through the public ads, which used to prolong and raise the price of the 
procedure. It is envisaged that only the general conditions of employment are determined 
by the law, and that all other conditions needed for the specific job are determined by the 
employer (all types of flexible employment known in developed economies are available, 
too). The firing process is also simplified. The law quotes the justified and unjustified 
reasons for firing (article 101). Unjustified reasons are quoted in order to prevent the 
discrimination of workers (according to gender, religion, race, etc.). Justified reasons are 
those which come from the non-fulfillment of some of the elements of the contract by the 
                                                 
36 Klaus Miler, the director of Micro Finance Bank in Belgrade, for The Wall Street Journal. 
36 Official journal of the Republic of Serbia, December 13, 2001.  
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employee or from the fact that the need for a certain job ceases to exist due to some 
technological, economic or organizational reasons. This reason is actually based on the 
market dynamics and uncertainty, and it represents the main criterion for firing the 
redundant labor force. Apart from that, the level of forwarding charges paid by the 
employer to the fired employee has been diminished, so the firing costs have been 
decreased in comparison to the previous legal solutions.   
  Another aspect of the flexibility is the adjustment of the wage level. The wage 
flexibility is now in the hands of collective bargaining. Unlike the previous system, the 
Law only provides the framework for a collective contract, and specific regulation of the 
questions in collective contracts is left to unions and employers. Leaving a possibility for 
the responsible minister to decide (if these is a justified interest) whether the collective 
contract or its specific parts are applied or not upon those employers who did not 
participate in the determination of the collective contract (art. 149) is not good. This 
possibility does ultimately exist in European countries, too. Still,  we do not see  the need 
in Serbia to apply this kind of unification. On the contrary  it is necessary to free 
enterprises and workers representatives to adjust the employment contracts to specific 
conditions and their own preferences.  
 The law allows to the participants of the bargaining process (Serbia's government, 
representative association of the employers and the representative union) to freely 
determine the minimun wage. If the agreement is not reached within 10 days, the 
Government autonomously makes the decision on the level of the minimum wage for the 
period of minimum six months. The wage is determined according to the working hour 
for the full working time. The employee has the right to the minimum wage only if he has  
worked a full working time and accomplished a standard efficiency. That way the 
minimum wage is related to the exact efficiency performed. Minimum wage does not 
protect all workers (if it is higher than the market wage, it only increases the 
unemployment), but it guarantees to state the minimal level of revenues coming from the 
income tax, because private employers, in order to avoid the state plunder, claim that they 
do pay their workers minimal wages, and in cash they subsidize them with the money 
undeclared in their enterprises balances of payment.  
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 What are the results in practice? No significant changes are felt yet. Serbia 
without Kosovo has 7,497,437 citizens in 2002, some 69,500 less than on the census from 
1991. The ratio of employed to total population is low and it is on decline. Total 
employment in Serbia in August 2001 and in May 2002 was 1,550,886 and 1,476,468 
respectively.38 Total employment from March 2001 to March 2002 is down 5.3%. The 
official unemployment rate (without workers on «forced leave») for 1998, 1999, 2000, 
2001 and 2002 amounts in 25.1%, 26.5%, 27.3%, 27.8% and 29% respectively. Total 
number of officially unemployed persons moves around 850,000, and it is higher in 2002 
compared to 2001 for some 5%. In addition, nearly one million is employed in de facto  
bankrupted firms. Unofficial unemployment rate is estimated to some 50%, and it reflects 
the real situation on labor market. In order to survive, the majority of unemployed 
working force operates on the black market.  
                   The dichotomy of the formal and informal ( grey) market is still sharp.37 
Formal labor market is characterized by: a low level of working engagement of the 
population, low labor force mobility, mass open and hidden unemployment (up to 80% of 
the unemployed has to look for a job for longer than 1 year), high participation of the 
youth in overall unemployed population, low wage level, high disparity of the wages 
among the employed people of equal or similar qualifications. It is estimated that at least 
1 million people are engaged in the grey economy.  High participation of the grey market 
is not a surprise, as many private enterprises function in this zone of the economy. High 
participation of the grey market shows that something is wrong with the existing system 
of rules. Unchanged condition of the labor market is the consequence of the fact that the 
processes of the creation of new enterprises and of the privatization are slow, so that a 
smaller number of new jobs is created and the managers are not induced to adjust the 
level and the structure of employment. They have no motive to behave as entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, one should not forget that the Labor law represents just the first step in 
the reform of the labor market institutions. Many laws that should support this law are to 
be changed. In other words, the reform of the labor market is still at its very beginning. 
Because of that, current bad results are not a big surprise.       
                                                 
38 Ekonomist magazin, no. 120, September 9, 2002, p. 65. The figure covers firms in state (public) 
ownership, social cooperatives and mixed ownership. Private firms employ additional 580,000 people.  
37 For a detailed insight into the condition of the labor market in Serbia, see: Krstić & Stojanović, 2001.  
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 In the last few months, the unions come up with new demands more and more 
often, trying to back up those demands with the threat of a general strike. The 
Government has different responses to those demands: sometimes it accepted demands, 
and sometimes it doesnt. Its activities are determined according to how capable a 
specific union is to exercise a social and political pressure.  Coming up with some 
demagogical demands for redistribution according to the strength of the pressure is 
wrong, because the point of the transition is on allocative rather then on distributive 
dimension. In comparison to the other reform moves of the new authorities, the Labor 
law is one of the better ones, because it fits better to the practice of the developed 
economies. Still, there is a possibility for a further rapprochement of the labor market 
regulation to the free market principles, especially to the key points of the law, such as 




                  Monetary policy has often been pointed out as one of the major achievements 
of the reforms in Serbia. For example, EBRD states: "The strict monetary policy of the 
National Bank of Yugoslavia (NBY) has led to lower inflation, a sharp rise in foreign 
currency reserves and stable exchange rate."39 However, the truth is that it has been 
continued with policy  similar to that in other spheres. Some cosmetic changes have 
been done, new chiefs of NBY have been elected, but rules of the game were not changed 
significantly. New monetary policy-makers suppose they know better then market what is 
real exchange rate for dinar (YUD), should people save in domestic or foreign banks, 
how many bureau de change should be and where it should be located, how many banks 
is needed, what is the amount of foreign currency citizens can take with them on the trip 
abroad, should transactions be carried out in dinars or foreign currencies, and so on.  
                   Yet in October 2000, when it had to be determined whether to a) adopt bi-
currency system, b) abandon national currency, c) implement currency board regime or d) 
continue with old practices  a wrong decision is made. There was no need for "serious 
                                                 
39 Cf. EBRD (2002), p. 4.  
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econometric analyses" to conclude that confidence in domestic currency is low, inflation 
expectations are high and ingrained, and accordingly the currency will be more stable if 
the space for monetary policy is smaller. Otherwise, more "monetary policy" leads to less 
credible currency. Having euro or dollar as a competitor to dinar would have been 
excellent mechanism for subduing domestic monetary policy-makers, but it was waived 
from the very beginning. 
                   However, arguments for making the NBY "the most profitable legal 
person" in Serbia prevailed. In September 2000, M 1 and M 2 were 23bn and 29bn dinars, 
respectively. Due to money velocity decelerating,40 these aggregates could increase to 
89bn and 98bn dinars 41 respectively, without causing inflation that would be attributed 
to money supply accretion.42 On 21st August 2002, monetary stock M 2 has already 
reached 102bn dinars, and the Governor put into circulation new 5.000 dinars (80 USD) 
bill, but refused to say what is the issue of the denomination.43 It was actually seventh 
new bill issued since October 2000. 
                  The program of maximizing of seigniorage while not causing "too high 
inflation" has played an important role in rejecting dollarization or bi-currency 
system.44 The practice of giving credits to bankrupted firms  at non-market criteria45 has  
been continued (although to a lesser degree) rather than abandoned. Opportunity cost of 
losing "creative monetary policy " is reduction of incentives for real sector reforms.46  
                   Bad primordial choice has been followed by other old practices, and so the 
modest results of the NBY in dinar's stabilization are not surprising:   
▪ Inflation is reduced, but not stopped. In 2001, anticipated inflation was  
approximately 30%, while real inflation rate, measured by increase of consumer prices, 
was 38.7%. In 2002, it is expected its further fall bellow 20%. Nevertheless it is  
                                                 
40 That was a consequence of extremely high inflation expectation decreasing aft er old government change.  
41 Preliminary data for June 1, 2002.  
42 For example, for 2001, NBY anticipat ed approximately 30% inflation rate. Some 15pp would be the 
consequence of pri ce liberali zation and almost 15pp the core inflation  a category miles away from 
disparity elimination.  
43 Reports from press conferences, published August 22, 2002 in daily newspapers "Blic" and "Danas".  
44  Currency competition is better solution. 
45 Unfortunately, every time and everywhere, any money invested by state is a wasted money. Money 
invested by NBY was used for "reforms del ay" and creating impression that there are "reforms without 
reform measures taking" and "living standard improvement without productivity increase."  
46 Although "reformists" would probably find some other borrowing source.  
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worthwhile mentioning that inflation during first seven months in 2002 has been 8,8%, 
what may mean a 14-22% annual rate. Much higher inflation rate was in period 
September 2000-September 2001, but that was due to freeing prices and correction of 
price disparities, i.e. one of the very few good things done by ex-regime wishing to 
cause social-economic problems to new authorities by liberalizing prices. The existence 
of notable core inflation suggests that dinar is not a good solution, because the level of 
inflation expectations is rather high.  
▪ Besides being high, inflation is also unpredictable, what is considered as a 
significant problem in economics. 
▪ NBY claims that exchange rate is "fairly stable" and dinar has lost only some 6% of 
value compared to euro in the period October 2000 - September 2002. This is a huge 
delusion supported by the facts that there is no freedom of money and capital 
movement, and that dinar was considerably undervalued during previous regime47. 
Current exchange rate is preserved by administrative measures (mentioned at the 
beginning of this section) and it has become a mean of political promotion a long time 
ago.  
▪ NBY has also declared external convertibility of dinar, supported by the IMF. 
However, the only measure of convertibility is the market, whose vote is utterly 
different from that of NBY and IMF, since there is almost no commercial bank in the 
world ready to buy dinars.48 This time, the major culprit is the real sector that does not 
have adequately attractive export products to increase consequently the demand for 
dinars abroad.    
▪ The difference between interest rate on dinars and interest rate on foreign currencies  
is an obvious indicator of domestic currency quality. While interest rates on foreign 
currencies are expressed in annual, interest on dinars is expressed in monthly 
amounts.49  
                   Administrative means are also used in commercial banking regulation: 
                                                 
47 Due to extremely high inflation anticipation and destroyed national economy, foreign currency demand 
was very inelastic and caused dinar undervaluation.   
48 Even, foreign banks that have branch offi ces in Belgrade do not offer dinar outside Serbia. 
49 For example, Delta Banks annual interest rate for euro is 4,8%, but monthly interest rate for dinar is 2%.  
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▪ A phantom institution  NBYs Clearing and Payments Department (ZOP), which 
has changed its name several times during last decade  still exists.50 ZOP is a type of 
monetary police and during this year, one of its parts has been named Nacionalna 
tedionica (National Savings  Institution, NSI) and become another state-owned 
commercial bank. Special paradox happened at opening of the NSI: just some ten days 
before, four largest state banks were shut down, and some of owners /founders of this  
newly opened bank are largest debtors of these four banks, such as C-market.  ZOP 
still performs payment operations in Serbia instead of transferring it to commercial 
banks. NBY announces that payment operations will be transferred to commercial 
banks from January 1, 2003, although similar announcements in the past turned out to 
be a lip service.  
▪ Moreover, in accordance with non-realistic estimations was also the NBYs  
decis ion to ban greenfield foreign banks entrances after couple of months, and to 
condition the entrance with buying some of domestic banks. It has been decided that 
only five foreign banks 51 can enter on the Serbian market wherewith NBY showed its 
non-market determination.  
▪ To foreign banks is imposed an obligation to invest in Serbia 50% (class A) and 
75% (class B) of collected deposits. If they do not so, non-invested amount up to 50% 
or 75% must be deposited on special account at NBY.52  
                   Thus, an increase of savings and foreign currency reserves is not surprising:   
▪ In spring 2002, foreign currency savings grew up to 651m euro, while dinar savings  
were just approximately 40m euro. In mid-2002, the trend of savings has been stagnant 
and deposits short-termed. Increase of saving in the beginning of 2002 was primarily 
due to privilege to convert national currencies of "Euroland" countries into euro via 
short-term savings without paying the conversion fee. The data translated into relative 
indicators are even more disappointing: just 15% of disposable foreign currencies are 
on citizens' savings accounts. NSB pays annual interest rate (for foreign currencies) of 
1.5-2.5% on three-year deposits, what is lower than inflation rate in euro and USD zone 
                                                 
50 Nowadays known as NBYs Clearing and Payments Department (ZOP). 
51 Very soon foreign banks held 35% of total deposits in Serbian banking sector, although 60% of that 
saving was caused by conversion in Euro and escaping conversion fee. Cf. EBRD 2002.  
52 NBY then invests these resources, without giving any accounting to the banks whose money it is 
where those funds go and under what terms they have been invest ed.  
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in 2002. Moreover, the same bank pays interest rate of 25% on dinars, yet savings in 
foreign currencies is 13 times larger than savings in dinars.53 
▪ National foreign currency reserves have significantly increased and reached the 
level of approximately 2.7bn USD, but the problem is that in commercial banks is to be 
found around 870m USD only. Important source of the foreign currency reserves is  
compulsory conversion54 of all donations and loans into dinars, as well as obligatory 
foreign currency reserves imposed to the banks.  
▪ On June 2002, dinar has been declared as the only legal tender of payment (except 
for some minor exceptions, such as res idences buying, rent paying), and payments in 
foreign currencies are put out of the law. Such decision is  not reasonable in the country 
where 4/5 of money supply consists in foreign currencies, so the majority of citizens is 
in danger to become criminals. The latest decis ions, which should perpetuate 
'patriotism' in monetary sphere and induce citizens to use dinars as much as possible, 
emphasize that building trust in dinar does not go as planned, and it would be a pity not 
to broaden the use of dinars in capital transactions (smaller ones), since there is huge 
potential for further penetration of domestic money.55 The only problem is that citizens 
in Serbia do not believe in high quality of domestic currency, but there are newly 
imposed Draconian fines for changing the perception.56 
▪ During 2001, real discount rate was mostly negative and on annual and monthly 
level it was respectively: in March 1.3% and 0.1%; in June 29.86% and 1.8%; in 
September 1.41% and 0.1%; in December 6.94% and 0.95%. The same practice 
continued in April 2002 (-0.52% and 0.04%). This implicitly means it can be counted 
                                                 
53 M. Kovačević, 2002, p. 7. 
54 According to order issued by the Serbian Ministry of Finance and NBY, commercial banks are obliged to 
immediately convert donations and grants (regardless whether they are awarded to state, municipality, 
organization or NGO) into dinars at current exchange rat e. Donation or grant user receives dinars, and 
foreign currency becomes a part of foreign currency reserves. Therefore, NBY and Serbian Ministry of 
Finance force commerci al banks to violate contracts with their clients (contracts clearly point out that 
money in banking account have to be in foreign currency, no way in dinars) and force them to bear dinar 
depreciation risk, although dinar lost 6% of its value compared with euro. 
55 In the beginning of this year, Serbian citizens converted over 8bn DM into euro and other currencies, and 
certainly they had signi fi cant amount of USD and CHF.  
56 Trying to continue with previous politics of enforcing the use of domestic currency, NBY has imposed 
Draconian fines for use of foreign currency. Fines for physical persons are between 200 and 21,000 dinars 
(3-339 USD), and for legal persons between 4.200 and 630,000 dinars (68-10,000 USD). These laws are 
Draconian in country with average monthly wage of 150 USD.  
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on socialization of poor investment decisions57 or monetary policy measures can 
neutralize weaknesses of the real sector. 
▪ Central bank continued with its 'successful operations', especially by engaging in 
philanthropic activities (e.g. scholarships to students and improving health care in 
Serbia), resolving problems of unemployment (continuing to enlarge its bureaucratic 
apparatus and wasting money on employing totally useless employees such as   
hostesses in NBY headquarter).  It turned out that NBY is also a loss-making institution, 
although central banks usually gain seigniorage. In 2001, the NBY suffered a loss of 
8.25bn dinars,58 and the Governor submitted its report on June 28, 2002, instead on 
March 31  the date of legal obligation for report. "Remaining value of NBY capital is  
just 1.2% of its total assets. Hence, the central bank is significantly undercapitalized. 
NBY liabilities are 84 times larger then its capital."59 
                   However, it would be wrong to impute all omissions  to NBY and its 
Governor, since the responsibility for lack of financial market and lagged reforms in 
banking sector rests, to the great extent, on ruling coalition that does not carry out 
reforms in real sector. It is limited space to perform reforms of the banking sector, 
without comprehensive economic reforms.  
                   Dinar cannot be stable and monetary policy credible, if national currency 
stays under a greenhouse established by "administrative measures". Currency 
competition would be excellent step toward reestablishing confidence in domestic 
currency, and monetary policy-makers would be restrained for "creative innovations".     
                   Reforms in monetary sphere are far away from being satisfactory, 
especially having in mind: the use of administrative violence; the NBYs bureaucratic 
paternalism; competition inhibition; banks exposition to restrictive measures; high and 
unpredictable inflation; quasi-stable exchange rate preserved by force, and foreign 
currency reserves increase as consequence of administrative violence.   
                                                 
57 Foreign banks do not want to participate in socialization, so MFB approved only 1800 credits with total 
amounts of only 12m euro, till April 2002. Up. EBRD 2002, p. 8.  
58 Cf. M. Kovačević 2002, p. 7. Losses originated from writing off 9bn dinars of domestic banks debt to 
NBY. NBY also wrote off debts to some state-owned fi rms that make profits (JAT, some banks). Institute 
for Manufacturing Banknotes and Coins (it is not privatized), NBY Clearing and Payments Department (it 
has monopoly and collecting provision for all giro transactions) and Military Service are integral parts of 
the NBY. 




While strictly following the policy of nourishment of the old system with new 
people, the new authorities have managed to do next to nothing in two years for creation 
of a banking sector similar to countries which have adopted and implemented the basic 
principles of a market economy. Hairstyling of the shattered banking left the system that 
brought it to ruins practically intact. 
Structural changes were the most apparent ones, at the same time being the only 
bright stars of reforms. The officials started cleansing of the sector by revoking licenses  
and starting with liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings.60 The change in legislation has  
doubled the capital census requirement of banks, forcing the smaller institutions into a 
series of unreasonable and involuntary mergers.61 Licenses were revoked in some 
hopeless cases, which is good, yet questionable are the effects of the policy to give many 
banks "time to adjust". While not all-encompassing, the cleansing was arbitrary and 
indecisive; by being so, it was under a significant influence of interest groups, and there 
is a notable lack of political will to complete it.  Out of some fifty commercial banks  
existing at year-end 2001, only five had posted profits. The surviving domestic banking 
system, as a whole, still has deeply negative equity (i.e. the banks aggregate liabilities  
are greater than the aggregate assets). 
The State is the main owner and, at the same time, creditor of the banking system. 
Growing State ownership clearly manifests the intention to prolong the States utilization, 
control of, and benefit from commercial banking. Apart from having most of controlling 
stakes62, the State, through nationalization of debtor banks, increases its majority 
                                                 
60 Some 23 de-licensings were applied, which halved total industry assets from 10.8bn to 4.7bn euro, not 
including 1.5bn euro in the still existing state claims from banks in liquidation. This data is taken from 
press, and are not reliable due to frequent changes and disputes between the NBY and Banks Association 
and other sides. Licenses were revoked from those banks ruined by the former system, and most of it 
relates to the 4 largest banks, carrying 5.5bn euro in assets (50% of sector assets), and 5.1bn euro in loans 
(of which 97% is classified as non-performing loans). Some 115m euro should be collectable. Fixed assets 
of all liquidated banks amount to 110m euro. Potentially, some extra 100m euro of frozen deposits in New 
York and Cyprus may be added to the liquidation value, making the total of approximately 325m euro. 
61 Some 11 mergers & acquisitions were forced, involving 29 small institutions in run from the 
progressively rising capital census. From 5m USD, capital census rises to 10m USD by late 2003. More 
mergers and acquisitions are expected in the future. 
62 Even with the minority stake, the State usually manages to keep full control, due to large diversi fication 
of individual shareholders, and low level of corporatization, in general. 
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ownership to a total of eleven banks, and minority stakes to seven more, holding the 
incredible 50-60% of total industry assets.63 Nationalization is performed under a "later 
privatization" motto, which is a tough pill to swallow.64 Similarly to that there is not 
enough political will to shut down weak or nearly-bankrupted banks, there is no political 
will to abandon the State's active participation (ownership) in the sector. Stalling of 
privatization prolongs loss-making, wasting time and whatever productive assets that 
remain, while depositors and partners are being exposed to risks they are not aware of. 
The State has, through the policy of an informal tax imposed on few existing successful 
corporates, founded even another new majority state-owned bank- the National Savings  
Institution (NSI), towards which business is directed through power of State discretion 
and arbitration. Top Serbian officials and the NBY Governor, through promotion of their 
newborn, abuse public posts and institutions they represent: besides regular 
representation of NSI, they, in a ritual manner and in front of national TV cameras, open 
private accounts with NSI, giving an example for others to follow. Of course, NSI 
deposits are booming comparatively afterwards.65 There is no intention to discard the 
nationalist and populist ideas of strong domestic (even State-owned) financial 
institutions.  
                                                 
63 Because of informal privatization, banks are currently owned by a diversified pool of private and state-
owned companies, and the state of management is chaotic. Therefore the State has a notion of active 
control in much more than 50-60 % of the banking sector assets, majority owned. A total of 18 banks were 
forced to issue new shares to convert Paris and London clubs debts into State equity. 
64 Property rights of the current shareholders are being severely violated, because the State increases its 
stake in the sector, on their account. The State got a massive bailout for a large part of debts from 
international creditors, and it should have applied relative write-offs to all debtor banks that would then be 
in position to clean their own balance sheets by off-writing their debts to final, SOE debtors, thus clearing a 
mass of balance sheets in the economy. The state has chosen to hold on to these  claims and to 
significantly increase its ownership and control in the banking sector, and later from final SOE debtors, 
through privatization. Such massive - scale etatization does not guarantee that the State shall success fully 
privatize these banks (as mentioned, to be sold to strategic partner) - to the contrary. Banks wishing to 
acquire a domestic bank and thus pay for the entry ticket, are looking to find considerably smaller and more 
viable partners. Etatization clears to an extent, by force, the ownership structure of banks before 
privatization, yet not enough to erase an additional obstacle of the highly diversified and chaotic, but 
private, ownership. Most likely, the States intention to sell out these banks will end-up in one of the three 
manners: i. Allowing again free entry, as a result of incapability to find a buyer (expensive entry ticket), ii. 
Selling the banks for peanuts value, or iii. Forcing of domestic corporates to purchase shares in banks, 
which is the least likely an option. In any of the cases, banks with no going concern will be shut down. In 
short, stakes in these banks remain property of the State in a longer run, while their agony is prolonged.  
65 Though minimal, taken into account that the majority of cash in economy still remains off- balance and 
off-shore, which truly represents a real (market) test of success of the monetary policy, trust in banking, 
currency and the State, as judged by population and corporates.   
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There seems to be no necessity to enhance the objective (non-State) insight into 
who is who in the financial sector. Although many banks still do not fulfill the basic 
prudency criteria, NBY considers them equally dear and sound, and categorizes them all 
together in the same A+B basket of banks. On the other hand, NBY financials and 
operations are kept far from the professional and public scrutiny. NBYs newly 
established Central Credit Register Information charges extraordinary fees for its low 
quality services, while having monopoly over such information and activity. The 
nourished lack of transparency is likely to create more chaos once payments in domestic 
currency are (eventually) transferred from the socialist-era payments bureau (NBY-ZOP) 
to commercial banks. 
The State prolongs the practice of intense arbitration in commercial banking, 
while doing nearly nothing for creation of an institutional framework that would foster 
fair competition and banking on commercial, and not on political basis, as in the eighties  
and nineties. The authorities still to a significant extent govern the decision-making of 
most bank managers: while still operating in little or plenty collision with prudential 
criteria, banks are in constant fear of punitive measures. Banks are also are in fear of 
other, arbitrary punitive measures by the NBY and the state in general, such as those 
based on theExtra-Profit Tax Law and other.66 Administrative violence67 creates an 
atmosphere of fear and obedience, while banks carefully earmark the slightest signals  
coming from the NBY and State authorities. The State enjoys the status quo as it provides 
for high amount of control and power over the sector, and through banking over the 
corporate sector as well. Of course, there are rewards for the obedience- big business 
always involves the State as intermediary, while the State often has decisive influence on 
choosing of a banker between the partners involved. Along with the increments of 
influence and arbitration68 of the State, as active owner and manager of banks, other, 
informal ties are created. More time and energy is spent on assuring the public of 
soundness of individual banks and the banking system, as with the success of reforms, 
                                                 
66 Media statements of the Governor often have serious consequences on operations of commercial banks. 
67 As described here and in part on Monetary Policy, regulation of commerci al banking 
68 A good example would be the one when the governor Dinkić gave to the press his assured beliefs on that 
Komercijalna bank would overcome foreign (start -up) Rai ffeisen bank, in terms of the collected new 
foreign currency deposits, while the headline in the Telegraf was  Komercijalna shall roar past 
Raiffeisen". It soon happened, needless to say, and the Governor was right.    
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than actually changing anything. Such impact of State influence is additionally supported 
by the lack of transparency in the sector. As one of the consequences, there is a high 
influence of such advertising on choices such as where to maintain accounts, deposit 
funds, and who to bank with in general. Since there are still no serious risk management 
and pricing functions in domestic banking, Komercijalna bank and similar large banks  
are able to eliminate the risk factor from their pricing, thus offering significantly higher 
interest rates on deposits69. Together with advertising from the side of the State, this is 
the main factor of the relative, short-term success of domestic banks in comparison to 
newly- founded foreign banks subsidiaries. On the other hand, and as a price to pay, 
domestic banks, strengthened in such a manner (under the infusion of new savings), are 
made into corner-stones of financing of the pre-privatizational reconstruction of the 
State-owned economy, and are building rather shaky loan portfolios. The State influence 
is so great and inconsiderate, that the State even presumes to offer and promise financing 
on behalf of some banks 70. The state puts an enormously strong pressure on banks to 
inject money in the economy, attempting to jump-start the economy, disregarding the fact 
that opportunities are truly scarce in reality71. Domestic banks simply follow this, while 
foreign banks successfully withstand the pressures. Whereas there is no possibility to 
price and charge these commercial risks taken on the State and Socially-owned 
enterprises (SOE), nor for the deals where the State appears as a guarantor, domestic 
commercial banks are gambling not only with their own newly attained solvency and 
capital base, but also with newly attracted savings 72. High reliance on state budget 
liquidity, and vast placements of the same in the state and social (quasi-state) corporate 
                                                 
69 For interest rates, see a part of this study on monetary policy.  
70 An example is when Z. Đinđić tried to soothe the syndicate of berry-like fruit producers who 
demanded greater price protection from the State, by offering credit for the purchase of crops from farmers 
(mostly from Komercijalna bank)  
71 This may be seen from the fact that the foreign banks, having the experience and know-how in risk 
evaluation of potential borrowers, experience great difficulties in finding creditworthy applicants (mostly 
short term working capital financing of the established players, with some low scale 2-year max investment 
financing of the same, and truly exceptionally the mid and long-term financing of the country's blue chips. 
All lending activities are collateralized.   
72 State and  socially (quasi-state) Owned Enterprises (SOE), are last traceable points of losses in the 
economy. Although for many the going concern is weak, while value and marketability are next to none, 
these very same SOEs mainly exist untouched by the bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. Instead, 
hazardous materials that already shattered the banking sector, are now supported by the State which 
obviously still considers them a part of the system. Unfortunately, these enterprises still actively participate 
and, due to size and support they get from state and quasi-state banks, strongly influence the financial 
market by distorting reality (interest rates).  
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sector, can also lead to solvency problems of largest domestic banks (VB, Komercijalna 
bank, AIK bank, Delta bank). There seems to be no end to the States preferential 
treatment of domestic banks, and suggestions for aggressive lending policies despite 
existing limitations; Such dangerously one-sided State interventionism has ruined the 
system before 2000, and there is no reason to assume that this time it will be different.  
Only five "domestic banks with foreign capital"73 were allowed to enter green 
field, since October 2000. After that, governor Dinkić set his stance on market economy 
by downing the curtain for free entry, deciding that there was enough foreign competition 
on the market. Foreign banks now wishing to enter the market, are informally taxed by 
purchasing one of the domestic banks, which proved to be simply too high cost for a 
more significant FDI in the banking sector. Even the foreign banks are informally taxed 
for their activity: the State makes them see the world without any system risks, and to 
take huge risks on the NBY - banks are forced to keep 50% of their collected and un-
placed foreign currency savings on their quasi-provision accounts of the NBY quasi- 
reserves system.74 Not only are the banks taxed informally and forced to take State risk 
this way, but also are depositors whose deposits are half-way "taken care of" by the 
NBY, who also keeps a percentage of their interest. Apart to this humiliation, image and 
reputation of foreign banks are widely "borrowed" by the State who uses their presence to 
captivate public belief in strength and health of the banking sector in general. Even they 
are occasionally forced to sign various PR protocols on future lending activities in line 
with the wishful thinking nourished by the State officials.  
The short-term economic policy of creating stability now becomes a long-term 
political goal of stalling with the status quo and delaying the reforms. As in other areas, 
there is no real intent for an all-encompassing reform. The lack of healthy regulation is  
still an acute problem, while the system still protects the borrower instead of the lender. 
Strong state presence, control and arbitration, are still fervent and popular measures- 
privileges, at one side, and state coercion at the other, remain the dominant criteria of the 
business environment in banking but also in the real sector.  
                                                 
73 Hereaft er referred to as "the foreign banks" - Reiffeisen banking group, Micro Finance Bank (EBRD, 
FMO, IMI, Commerzbank), HVB group (Hypovereinsbank & Bank of Austria),  Alfa bank, all joined 
Societe Generale, who opened a subsidiary in Belgrade early in 1991. 
74  Funds which NBY (though not admittedly) most likely places abroad for their own account, and against 





                   Serbian securities market could be divided into several segments: bills of 
NBY, commercial papers and short term bonds of companies, old frozen foreign currency 
savings bonds (FX bonds) and equities. 
                   Because the Treasury is established just few months ago, there are no T-bills 
in Serbia. Instead of that, NBY is issuing its own securities to conduct monetary policy. 
Primary sale is on the Belgrade Stock Exchange, what is very rare in the world, but the 
government is trying to find a job for the stock exchange which is under great influence 
of the same government. The method of primary auction is so called quantity auction. 
The price (or the interest rate) is determined by the government rather than on the market, 
and buyers are biding just for the quantity. Only banks and other financial institutions can 
bid at the auction. Maturities, interest rates and quantities from the auction on August 30, 
2002 are shown in the table: 
 
Maturity                      Interest rate                           Volume  
  (Days)                               (p/a)                              (Mn YUM) 
 
30        10.50%        1,200 
60        11.50%           120 
90        14.00%               87  
          180        15.00%     0 
 
                   What could be easily seen is that the yield curve does not go so long in the 
future, so that is the reason for the absence of secondary trading, and without secondary 
trading there are no real open market operations. Additional restrictive element for the 
development of secondary market is given by the NBY that provides a wide open 
discount window for these bills if there are some liquidity problems in the bank. Instead 
of selling these bills on secondary market to another bank, or arranging repo agreement, 
banks are trading with the central bank. Just for a comparison, secondary market of short 
term government securities is one of the most liquid in market economies and advanced 
transitional countries. 
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                   There are several reasons for very limited possibility in establishing liquid 
and long term government security denominated in local currency. First, participants in 
the financial market perceive currency risk as very high, so banks neither have the source 
for long term investments in their balance sheets, nor there are other players that are 
willing to do that directly. Second, liquidity premium for the long term security is too 
high, so the issuers are not willing to accept it. They are issuing short term security and 
roll it over when it matures. Third, there are no huge institutional investors like pension 
funds and insurance companies that need such financial instrument. 
                   Even though, turnover of these securities represents 52.90% of total turnover 
on BSE, and 1.20% of whole number of transactions. 
                   Commercial papers and short term bonds of companies are also traded just on 
a primary market. Maturities are very rarely over one month with little chance for 
development of secondary market. Because of huge credit risk of issuers, interest rates 
are between 1.8% and 3.2% per month. What could be easily noticed is that market 
participants anticipate credit risk very well, so the spread between interest rates of 
different issuers is very high.  
                   Trading (better to say: issue) of these securities is on the OTC (over the 
counter market), but there is mandatory report to the BSE, for what 0.05% fee has to be 
paid. This trading represents about 40% of whole turnover on stock exchange and OTC 
(25% belongs to commercial papers and 15.40% belongs to short term bonds of 
companies). In the number of transactions, this trading represents 68.60%. 
                   This market segment emerged spontaneously because banking sector was not 
able to find sources of financing for enterprises and it represents a good example on how 
there is no need for involvement of government in the process of developing financial 
market.  
                   Trading with the old frozen foreign currency saving bonds (FX bonds)75 
started at the end of November 2001. From that time and before the new Law on 
satisfying claims against public debt from frozen currency savings, less than 1% of public 
                                                 
75 That are savings that were 'frozen' in Yugoslavian and Serbian banks at the begining of 1990ies. There 
was not any repayment for years. During 2000. small repayments started and will last till 2016. That is 
because IMF imposes a restriction as precondition for a current 'Stand By Agreement' - no more that 0.9% 
of Serbian GDP can be used for satis fying claims against this debt. In the meantime, people receive bonds 
that could be sold with a discount. 
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debt was converted into the FX bonds, and about one half of bonds changed hands. 
Organized trading with these bonds takes part on the BSE, it is denominated in EUR and 
the settlement of the transaction is on the T+3 regime (three days after trading).  
                   Trading with these bonds  represents 1.40% of total turnover on the BSE, and 
there are several reasons for such poor liquidity. Government wanted to provide 
incentive for trading and wanted to protect the original holder of the bonds, so:  
- conversion lasted few days and old people had to go several times in the bank;  
- government gave strong recommendation to banks not to buy the FX bonds 
from the people on OTC, than to advocate them to sell the bonds on the BSE.  
People had to go to the Central Register to immobilize bonds, to a broker to 
put signature on the agreement for trading on stock exchange, and at the end, 
back to the bank to open foreign currency accounts of the special purpose, 
one if they want to sell their bonds and another if they want to buy bonds; 
- payment gone through correspondent foreign banks, because of settlement in 
EUR, and people often had to wait more than three days with cost greater than 
5% on small transactions;  
 
                  It is important to notice that from the time when banks started to buy bonds on 
the OTC, competition on a buying side resulted in declining of implicit interest rates and 
discounts, and raising the price of bonds. On September 04, 2002, trading was like this: 
 
 Series   Price        Implicit interest rate        Volume (EUR) 
 A2003   92.00%  11.90%  1,707 
 A2004   81.00%  12.88%  1,182 
 B0000   48.00%  13.40%           60,213 
  
  The new Law enabled conversion of total amount that was frozen into the bonds 
that matures from 2002 to 2016. Previously, it was possible to convert about 10,000 DM 
per saving book. Bonds are issued in book entry form, as an electronic file in Central 
Register, what gives the possibility for the government to limit the rights of the owners 
with excuse of development of financial markets.  
                   In the year of privatization, equities of about 30 privatized companies were 
listed on the BSE. The method of privatization is in favor of strategic investors, and there 
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are two models of auctions: first when the small share-holders are selling their securities  
and the other when the government is selling its stake, without any take-over bid 
procedure. 
                   It is not hard to guess that shares of the one company are sold at couple of 
times higher price when the government is seller than when the seller are small share-
holders. Neither the current, nor the draft of Securities Market Act has the privatization as 
the objective of regulation. As a result, there is no liquid market of equities. 
Discontinuous single price auctions are organized usually once in a month, and turnover 
of equities represents 3.30% of total turnover of the BSE. 
                   Registration and transfer of ownership on equities is done within the 
Temporary Registry, which is a part of the Agency for privatization. At least, that is 
serious conflict of interest and an opportunity for corruption. Because of bad technical 
and IT infrastructure, the settlement cycle is unpredictable and can last for more than five 
days.  
                   The major influence for further development of securities market will have 
Securities Market Act and Foreign Exchange Law. The first is in the stage of draft and 
the second was adopted during this year. 
                   Foreign Exchange Law restricts capital outflow, so the Yugoslav citizens 
cannot buy securities of foreign issuers. That is a wrong solution because the investors 
are not free to choose about allocation of their capital, and that is a negative incentive for 
employment of capital that is now in pallets. Banks could deposit money in foreign 
banks, but they are not free to buy foreign securities either. That means that domestic 
investors are unable to hold low-risk asset like equities  and bonds  of well known foreign 
companies or foreign government securities. Because of that, institutional investors 
cannot sustain their capital in a long term, and there is a little possibility for developing 
of private insurance companies and pensions funds.  
                   Foreign exchange law enables denomination and trading of securities in 
foreign currency. That is a prerequisite for development of long term debt instruments.                   
                   Draft of the Securities Market Act stipulates that every new issue of securities 
will be in a book-entry form (dematerialized) as electronic file in the Central Registry. 
Central Registry, as one of the most important institutions in the financial market, should 
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be non-profit, monopolistic institution with government as a major share-holder. By 
being non-profit, nobody beyond the state will be interested to get its shares.  
                   The stock exchanges should be profit organizations that could be set up 
freely, with capital requirement of 100,000 EUR. However, some technical and staff 
requirements should be fulfilled too, what could be the great excuse for the government 
to forbid the establishment of new, privately owned, stock exchanges. 
                  Trading with securities is allowed just on the stock exchange, with the 
exception of institutional investors who could trade on OTC too, what represents a 
serious violation of ownership rights. Capital requirement for the broker-dealer 
companies should be several times higher than now, what would have a negative impact 
on competition between intermediaries. Securities and Exchange Commission should 
have great responsibilities, it should be independent institution, but the time will show if 
that is possible. 
                   The development of securities market is prerequisite for development of 
financial market and efficient allocation of resources, what is of great urge in transitional 





                  While stock exchange in market economy operates continously, the days of 
any significant trade on the Belgrade stock exchange (BSE) are rare. During May and 
June 2002. shares were traded once per month, in July once per week. «Old savings'» 
bonds are traded daily, but the amplitude is limited to some tens thousends of USD. 
Contrary to usual crowd and bustle on world stock exchanges, on the BSE it prevails 
peace like in some rarely visited memorial, clients are rare and staff shortens time 
through conversations and computer games. The fact that the vital institution of market 
economy is not operating normally almost two years after democratic changes took place 
indicates that reforms have had not started yet.  
                   Shares from state owned Action fund were traded just for 36% of their book 
value, indicating overevaluation of the booked value compared to market price. In order 
to be traded, shares need to be registered in the Temporary register. Until July 2002. the 
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shares of just 200 among more than 1000 shareholders' firms were registered in the 
Temporary register. Even in these 200 cases the ownership structure was not adjusted to 
shareholders' books that are considered authoritative in legislation. It seems that shares 
for more than 1000 firms privatized76 via insiders' privatization under Milosevic are 
traded informally outside the BSE. Trades on the BSE rises transaction costs, restricts 
ownership rights and lowers profits from trade. Trades outside the BSE are illegal 
according to current legislation, and some officials favor their legalisation. Although such 
an proposal is reasonable, officials should support legislative changes rather than the 
break of law.  
                   Trades on the BSE are over-bureaucratized, complicated and expensive, with 
a lot of nonsensical solutions. In their first trade, shares are traded on prevailing price, 
based on book price. Trades are suspended if anybody offers a price that is for more than 
20% higher or lower from prevailing price. Obligatory prevailing price and 20% 
limitation distorts normal trades, and by limiting the price reduces gains and so the 
incentives for trade. This method favors large buyers, what in practice leads to priveleges  
for management and what disadvantages small investors.  
                   Although the price of a huge majority of shares is lower than book value, 
there are some exceptions. Shares from the Apatin brewery were once traded 15 times 
higher than it was their book value, and authorities declared this transaction void. Before 
that, equities of Apatin brewery were traded according prevailing price, what is usually 
considered as a friendly price.77 The expectation of bureaucrats that share price will 
fluctuate just ±20% is completely unfounded, since the prices tend to fluctuate much 
more in the beginning phase of transition.  
                                                 
76 Many firms were privatized during 1992-1993. via insiders privatization. Owners got shares under 
market value during hyperinflation, since share prices were denominated in dinars. Democratic party (DS) 
and its leader Zoran Đinđić, at that time opposition leader and current prime minister, have proposed 
revalori zation of individual stakes in privatized firms in 1994. The motif for Đinđić and DS was to get 
demagogic votes: privatization was not just, nearly predatory, because new owners profited from 
hyperinflation. Miloevićs ruling socialists immediately accepted the proposal and draft ed the law, since 
they were interest ed to regain the control over firms and economy. Socialists and democrats voted together 
for the legislation, privatization was declared void via revalorization, and the Democrats have sent the 
message about their similarity with Socialists. Independently of that who rules, Serbia is not safe place for 
investment  was another message still echoing in this country.  
77 In both cases the transaction parties gone to court and the cases are not solved yet.  
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                   In August 2002. trading rules were slightly reshaped, deposit for auctions is 
lower and the period for organizing auctions is shorter for two weeks.78  
                   Shareholders in market economy may sell shares as soon as they like to do so. 
Shareholders in Serbia are first obliged to announce sale, at least 3 times  in 6 months. 
Shareholders are free to make announcements wherever they like; however, adds in press 
are expensive and the most convenient way is to use the announcement blackboards in 
firms, which are again controlled by management. Managers may use this power to 
prevent the transfer of shares, protecting their managing positions as well. This way 
managers relax pressure emerging from share trades. On the other side, hostile takeover 
is illegal in Serbia. This restriction should be lifted immediately in order to enforce 
shareholders rights and to stimulate market for managers.  
                   There are no investment funds in Serbia, and there is no reason for them to 
come or to emerge, because banks dispose over large non-invested capital and citizens 
hold more than 4bn USD in straw-mattresses. Just the Raiffeisen bank Serbia has  
collected more than 140m USD in deposits until July 2002, and it has invested in Serbia 
just some 20m USD. This indicates a poor business environment and a lack of eligible 
firms and programs. The BSE fits well to this situation with its thin trade of 1.2bn USD 
this year.79 
 
FISCAL SYSTEM  
 
                   When reforms of fiscal sector started, the new Serbian authorities  
promoted the creation of transparent tax system, non-budgetary items abrogation, and 
tax evasion suppression  in short, they have approached to the Western countries  
best practices.80 Principally, this is good direction of the reform, but a huge mistake 
has been done at the very beginning: the focus has been put on revenue side of the 
budget, i.e. on its increase by better tax collect ion. However, nothing has been done 
regarding either radical reduction of government spending or creating favorable 
                                                 
78 Instead of 33%, deposit will be 10% of the starting price. Period for notification of interest for auction is 
reduced from 15 to 5 days.   
79 That is the whole trade on the BSE from January 1 to the end of August, 2002. Cf. 
http://www.beolex.co.yu/trgovanje  
80 Cf. Popović, D. (2001), p. 1and 8.  
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business environment. Nourishing of "predatory state" is being continued, having as a 
consequence the emergence of such a business environment that is poor for new 
investments and that provides incentives to gray economy. Practice of informal taxes  
has also been continued,81 although non-budgetary spending is somewhat limited. 
                   While on the federal level just some fundaments of tax system, customs 
systems, and administrative taxes are determined, other relevant issues are defined on 
the republican level (more precisely Serbia, whereas Montenegro does not apply 
federal regulation since 1997). Partial reform of the tax system on the Serbian level 
has been accomplished by enacting tax legislation in spring 2001. It would be well if 
new authorities have also passed other reform law so quickly, and not just the tax 
ones. Hereby, aspiration to ensure a budget for bureaucracy is  obvious. The number 
of different taxes has been reduced from 270 to 230, but the tax burden has not been 
relieved. It has rather increased because during Milosevic era taxes and other duties  
had been calculated according to official  and not the market  exchange rate; there 
were cases of tax forgiving for many firms; and tax evas ion was much more 
extensive. From the table bellow one can see that some taxes  have been reduced, 
some kept on same level, and some increased. Social security contributions  have been 
lowered, but in the meanwhile, one part has been financed from donations.  
 
Table 2. Some tax types and tax rates 
 
FISCAL FORM  
Rates (according to 
previous regulation)  
Rates (according to new 
regulation) 
Turnover tax 31%, 28%, 21%, 18%, 15%, 
12%, 9%, 1%  
17% + 3%1) = 20% 
Corporation income tax 20% 20% 
Personal income tax 14% (salaries); 20% (other 
incomes) 
14% (salaries); 20% (other 
incomes) 
Property tax 0.4% 0.4% - 0.8% - 1.5% - 2% 
Tax on patrimony and gifts 2% - 3% 3% - 5% 
Tax on absolute rights transfer 3% 5% 
Social security contributions 26.6% 16.3% 
Tax on salary fund 4.3%2) max. 3.5% 
Tax on financial transactions 0.3%3) 0.3% 
Source: Popović (2001),  p. 2.  
1) This is rate of special federal tax on goods and services turnover.  
2)  Sum of previous payments for public utilities and residential dues. 
3) Sum of previous solidarity contributions and solidarity tax on financial transactions.  
                                                 
81 For example, cost of corruption, inflation, half-voluntarily sponsorships, contributions to political parties.  
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                   Serbia is  one of a very few European counties where VAT (value added 
tax) has not been implemented, but still exists the 20% turnover tax on goods and 
services and the lack of adequate tax information system is designated as a major 
reason for this situation. Personal income tax is still cedular. Employers' burden 
(payroll tax) indeed stayed unchanged s ince before reforms have started, 
approximately 0.78 dinars of various taxes and dues should be paid on 1 dinar of net  
salary and after implementing gross salary concept, the burden has been reduced to 
0.72 dinars. Excess salary burden continued to have negative effects on employment  
and practice of stimulating gray labor market (employees receive some net salary but 
relevant taxes  and other dues and contributions are not paid in respective budgetary 
accounts). Moreover, new legal solutions prescribe progress ive taxation of physical 
persons realizing annual income above certain threshold, meaning discouragement of 
more comprehensive and qualitative work and punishment of success. 
                   The authorities continually present 20% tax on corporate profit as a very 
low, although it is better to reduce fiscal burden in this area and attract investments 
instead of insisting that this tax rate is not higher than one in neighboring countries. 
In addition, services the Republic of Serbia offers for 20% turnover tax are far less  
good than ones of the s imilar price in neighboring countries. In the country where one 
of the major problems is overall poverty, it would be much more reasonable to reduce 
this tax rate on one-digit level,82 if not to annul it. An absence of understanding by 
reformers for such rationale is shown in rejection of substantial fiscal 
decentralization and fiscal competition among municipalities and regions : if 
municipalities or towns disclaim its tax revenues, revenues are automatically 
transferred to the Republics budget and thereby losing a possibility of tax burden 
chain reduction.   
                   Excise regime still exists and the state has determined that luxuries are 
things like table salt, beverages, etc. Excises stayed very attractive way of collecting 
budgetary revenues, as well as gray economy increase. Imposing high excises on 
certain types of goods stimulates development of illegal market of these commodities. 
                                                 
82 This measure would not mean budget revenue decrease due to gray economy legalization and economy 
growth increase. 
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For example, cigarette black market is about 50%, and there are also markets of other 
excised goods. In August 2002, the Government proclaimed combat against the gray 
economy, which most certainly once again articulate its non-market orientation. The 
Program would consist of reinforced actions of financial and regular police corps 
rather then obviating key incentives to gray economy. The Government neglects that 
gray market is the most market-oriented part of Serbian economy differing from 
regular one only in three aspects. First, it cannot be viewed and screened statistically; 
second, official taxes are not paid (some eventually yes, but not all of them); and 
third, due to tax evasion, this part of the economy is illegal.83 Adequate way of 
fighting gray economy does not consist in increasing already significant compulsion, 
but in eliminat ing causes of gray economy such as complicated regulations, high taxes  
and nonfunctional state institutions.   
                   The Government constantly promotes struggle against smuggling,84 but it 
is ins incere, nonsystematic and occasional, so being consequent ly with little (if any) 
success. The question is whether it is more efficient to repeal excises, improve scope 
of tax collecting and avoid cost of ostens ible "merciless combat", or preserve current  
condition. To show their "rectitude", reformers highly tax "luxury" such as cellular 
telephones , yachts and boats, weapons, what is a type of revengeful tax.  
                   Predatory state operation can also be seen when cons idering fees  on 
absolute rights transfers that have been increased from 3% to 5%, consequently 
increasing price of property rights exchange. This can only be interpreted as obvious  
evidence of a non-market way of thinking by new authorities. Additional proof of 
persistence is the level of tax on financial transactions (0.3%), up to recently linear. 
                   During first half of 2002, particular taxes contributed to the Serbian 
budget as it follows: turnover tax 48.4%; profit tax 23.5%; property tax 3.1%; fees  
3.1%; duties 7.3%; other revenues 14.6%. This clearly shows how obsolete and non-
stimulating tax system Serbia applies. 
                                                 
83 Hereby "black economy", such as traffic of illicit drugs or illegal weapon trade, is left beside. These acts 
are crimes according to provisions of several other laws, like Criminal code.   
84 Creating cost for taxpayers.  
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                   Therefore, Serbia is a country where taxes are inappropriately high, there 
are some 230 formal taxes/burdens , and government spending85 is above 54%. The 
rules  of the game are instable, additionally aggravating business environment. Instead 
of the described one, tax policy in Serbia should be based on completely different  
approach: reduction of formal number of taxes/burdens; low taxes  with unique rates  
(without tax exemptions); fiscal federalism, i.e. competition among jurisdictions; 
implementation of 10% VAT rate and synthetic tax on income with flat (not 
progressive) rate; repealing of turnover tax, tax on financial transactions, capital gains  
tax; excise taxes minimizing and its reduction on just several products. Thereby, 
entrepreneurial spirit would be instigated; gray economy legalization would begin; 
and instead of socialist (redistribution of poverty), the country would get a pro-
business tax system.  
Law on Extra-profit86 
 
After October 5, 2000, new authorities have stood under pressure and felt 
responsibility to punish close allies of the previous regime. However, the authorities did 
not prosecuted political and classical criminals of Miloevićs era, but the sword of the 
justice has been directed toward businessmen and firms. Therefore, the category of the 
extra profit has been devised by June 2001, encompassing all sources of proceeds from 
preferential position.  
The Law has revolutionary-political character; it is discriminatory and gives huge 
discretionary power to authorities when deciding who will come under its attack. The 
Law is retroactive and in collision with other laws. It covers the period of 12 years. If a 
firm, subject to the law by legislators decision, cannot provide evidence on its revenues 
for the entire period87, it can easily happened a firm, although it has not used any 
privileges, that it is obligated to pay the tax. Law predicts fifteen-day deadline for 
                                                 
85 Where, turnover tax on goods participated with 23.5 percentage points, turnover tax on services 11.1 pp 
and excises 13.8 pp. Cf. Dumezić 2002, p. 29. 
86 Law on One-Occasion Taxation of Extra Revenue and Extra Property Acquired by Using Special 
Privileges in Period January 1, 1989 - June 1, 2001.  
87 According to the Law on Accounting, firms are obligated to keep only annual balance sheets and 
earnings calcul ations for ten years. There is no longer obligation for other documents; semiannual balance 
sheets and accounting documents have to be kept five years, and sales and control blocks, accessory 
formularies and similar documentation for two years.     
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collecting evidence on twelve years business operations although commercial legislation 
allows six weeks deadline for annual balance sheet. 
                Apart from being opposite to the rule of the law cornerstones, the law 
worsens an already poor business environment caus ing money outflows toward gray 
market and abroad. Socially owned firms, subject to this law, are put in unfavorable 
position since the law does not charge firms managers, who on the one hand gained 
personal fortune and one the other hand caused loss to the firms  by poor management. 
Therefore, the firms are subject to the Law on extra profit, although particular 
individuals used all the benefits. Law charges invoiced amounts of purchased foreign 
currency, so if the firm performed its operations legally according to existing laws, now it 
is a subject of retroactive Law on extra profit. Similar situation is when considered quotas 
and other non-tariff barriers: nevertheless, Miloevićs regime was not able to allocate all 
contingents to its collaborators, rather one part was assigned to firms not belonging to ex-
regime nomenclature.   
                   The article of the law referring to punishments specifies that person not 
filling in its tax form will be fined by two to tenfold of evaded tax amount, although the 
law does not specify who and on what basis will determine it. 
                   The law does not accept limited liabilities, and firms' owners are liable with 
their overall property, even with property of their close and distant family members up 
to second degree of kinship in-low relatives.  
                   The results of enforcement of the extra-profit law are disastrous to its authors 
 till August 2002 just 60m USD has  been collected, although 800m USD was expected. 
Moreover, a half of this sum was  collected from one firm. A number of firms (e.g. 
"Simpo", "Lutra") charged with large amounts succeeded to significantly reduce its 
obligations; many firms were unaccountably exempted from taxation; and some firms, 
founded and enormously expanding during previous decade due to close relationships 
with former regime, were even not subject of the law (e.g., "Delta").  
Serbian authorities have announced repealing the Law on extra profit since 
October 2002, having in mind its unsuccessful implantation, even from governments 
point of view, and its inconsistence with market approach. However, "predatory state" 
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and it ministers are not still and silent, since they already announce new laws with similar 
purposes as previous one. For example, Boidar Đelić /Serbian finance minister, edit. 
/ said, tax law would enable tax authorities to compare taxpayer's property and life style 
with revenues reported to tax office. If significant discrepancy between two categories  
exists  administration will begin with the action.88 "Life style identification" of any 
individual is not possible without spying and other police-state measures. In addition to 
that, the authorities are announcing new Custom law, according to which customs 
officials, financial and regular policemen will have the right to control people and 
premises not only on state borders, but on entire Serbian territory as well. The law also 
allows that officials may enter into apartments, premises, and houses for the purposes of 
such control. Beyond these two draft laws, new legislation on special prosecutor's office 
and special forces against organized crime has already been adopted. These laws 
significantly simplify trespass procedures, arresting, following, property confiscations, 
imprisoning, etc. completely undermining basic safety standards of individuals and 
property. These laws could not function without "police state" that obviously has deep 
roots in Serbia since it survives during various regimes. Where these laws function, a 
message goes on how undesirable businesses are and that government has robber 
intentions toward its citizens.  
 
 
BUDGET AND STATE EXPENDITURES 
 
                    
                   It was common practice in former socialist countries to report higher GDP, 
making the sence of succesful economic progress. Contrary to that, during transition the 
GDP figures are lower due to tax evasion and a lack in solid statistics. It is especialy the 
case in agriculture, trade and services. Black market seizes large portions of economy in 
transition countries but Ukraine, Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia are clear leaders. The 
fact makes it difficult to compute exact GDP and government spending. Table below 
shows the dynamic of FRYs GDP. 
 
                                                 
88 Korica-Vukajlović, 2002, p. 16.  
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Table 3: GDP development in FRY1  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20022 
GDP growth in % * 10.1 1.9 -18.8 5.0 5.5 4.0 
GDP growth in % ** - 2.5 -18.0 5.0 5.5 4.0 
GDP growth in % *** 7.4 2.5 -23.5 6.4 5.5 4.0 
GDP growth in bn 
USD*3 
19.7 17.0 18.6 10.8 12.4 - 
*    The Economist Intelligence Unit: Yugoslavia, July 2002, p. 7.  
**  Balkan Times (www.balkantimes.com/resource_center2/sebianLatin/country_info_yugoslavia.html 
*** The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies.  
1) All data are for FRY without Kosovo. 2) 2002 estimated. 3) Serbia contributes approximetly with 93% 
in federal GDP. 
 
                   The table reflects congruence in calculating GDP among several sources for 
the period of 2000-2002. Estimates for 2002 are probably overstated since the data for the 
first seven months indicate a GDP growth of around 1.2-1.5%, and the growth of physical 
volume in manufacturing for 0.4%. EIUs GDP growth forecast of 6% for 2003 is also 
unrealistic. It seems that EIU accepts the same approach as the Government of Serbia that 
in its Economic development strategy until 201089projected long term growth rate at 
8.55% and in some sectors as high as 15%. If nothing changes effectively in the rules of 
the game Serbia can hardly expect average growth rates higher than 2% for the next 
decade. With this tempo of development a country needs 35 years to double its GDP per 
capita on the real basis. The government will of course overstate rates in time of budget 
planning making it easier to increase budgetary spending.  
                   According to the EIU data, cited also by the «Heritage Foundation», public 
spending in Serbia in 2001 was 24% of GDP. If this were true, Serbia would be among 
the European countries with lowest public spending. Unfortunately, spending of federal 
state, Vojvodina autonomy and municipalities was not included (Serbia is funding entire 
federal budget which accounts for 7.5% of Serbian GDP as Montenegro stalled 
contributions years ago). By adding contributions to the pension system total public 
                                                 
89 See. Strategija privrednog razvoja  (Economic development strategy of Serbia until 2010), (2002) p. 
87. The strategy is expression of a socialist approach where omnipotent planers design economic 
development without taking into account the reality, and as such it represents a fabri cation. Ironically, such 
a famous publication like the EIU permits arbitration like the following: The aggregate goals of the 
Strategy are not unrealistic  the Serbian economy is capable of growing at around 10% a year for an 
extended period of time. Cf. EIU, July 2002, p. 19. We can agree with the EIU, if Serbia reaches the level 
of economic freedom such as Estonia or New Zealand. There are scarce indications for such unfolding. 
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spending reaches 54% which places Serbia at the top of European list, just behind 
Sweden and Montenegro. The portion is probably even bigger since a number of state 
hospitals, schools, police, army and public administration are not paying for utilities and 
supplies. Informal taxation of firms to support governmental activities also increases  
public spending.  
                   The WB standards suggest that countries with income per capita at 1,500 
USD should limit public spending at 20% of the GDP, which implies that Serbia should 
decrease it's spending more than 2.5 times! There is tiny possibility for this as state 
expenditures for 2002 were projected at even higher level than a year before. Budget 
amounts to 234bn YUD (3.78bn USD)90, i.e. 2.6 percentage points above 2001 figure 
taking into account 4.5% GDP growth rate.91 Deficit was planned at 4.3% of projected 
GDP and will be financed by donations, privatization revenues and NBY credits. The 
budget is expected to reach 24.1% of GDP at 20% inflation rate in 2002. GDP is 
estimated at about 14bn USD.  Dispersed on 7.6m large population of Serbia it results in 
GDP/pc of more than 1,900 USD. General balance of public revenues and expenditure of 
the Government of Serbia calculated GDP at 979bn YUD, which at exchange rate on 
September 16, displays GDP/pc92 of some 2,060 USD. It seems that the Government 
calculates GDP at 1,900 or 2,060 USD when it is filling the budget, and at less than 900 
USD when negotiating with international funds for the IDA credit conditions are in 
question. Extension of this trend would lead to overall spending of 7.6bn USD or 54% of 
GDP. Huge state spending confirms that tax rates are very high, which combined with 
complex regulation and constant changes in regulation constitute three main factors of 
poor business environment. 
 
Social spending 
                    
                   Major budget items comprise allowances for employees (750m USD), goods 
and services (400m), payment of interest for international credits (370m), subsidies  
                                                 
90 See 2002 Budget of Republic of Serbia, Draft law, p. 5 
91 Estimation of the Economics Institute (see Ekonomist magazin, July 29, 2002, p. 28), GDP growth in 
first hal f of this year was 1.5% which relatively increases state spending. 
92  See General Balance of Public Revenues and Expenditure of the Government of Serbia; As stated in the 
Balance, GDP is quantified at 15.8bn USD, total state expenditures 47.62% of GDP which together with 
Federal state payments forms 55% portion of Serbia's GDP accounting about 8.7bn YUD. 
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($500m), pensions (740m), social welfare (380m USD), etc. To social care and social 
programs were alloted 45 bn YUD (725m USD).93  
                   The number of statistically registered unemployed persons is 850,000 
(official rate of unemployment in 2001 was 28%). In additon, the number of surplus of  
employed94 manpower is estimated around 700,000, which rises the number of socially 
endangered to 2m. Serbia, like no other transition country experienced massive inflow of 
refugees and it currently hosts 200-300 thousands of them from Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo.  
                   Although average salaries rose from 45 euro in October 2000 to 150 euro in 
September 2002, the general level of prices jumped to a simalar degree, so that 
purchasing power of salaries remained low. Poverty and misery are widespread outside 
urban centres. According to some analysis almost 60% of citizens lives below poverty 
line (2 USD per day). The WB reports that poverty now is twice as it was in 1990. 
Arround 12% is poor by the standards of «World Food Program», while another 20% is 
very poor.95 The consequences of grave socio-economic reality can be illustrated by 
surge of suicides, murders, mass killings, robberies and thefts which places Serbia in 
violent societies.  
                   Pensions have been paid regularly with accruals for three months. However, 
pension reform is based merely on extension of age limit for five years96 and shrinkage of 
rights on insurance for unemployed. The number of pensioners is huge (employees-
contributors ratio is 1.23:1) which together with ageing of population posts financial 
burden that current pay-as-you-go system is not able to cover. Even now, a significant 
part of pensions is covered from donations and budget.  
                   Health care and education sufferred from the absence of any kind of reforms. 
The post of health care minister was vacant for six months, which illustrates consistency 
and enthusiasm of those who should introduce changes to public and implement them.  
Education system is anachronous, teachers are unmotivated and corruption is 
widespread.  
                                                 
93 Subsidies to agriculture and depressed price of electricity and utilities should be added, too. 
94 It is expected that in the process of restructuring some 100,000-150,000 workers will loose their jobs in 
2002, though there is little possibility of this to happen regarding the current pace of privatization.  
95 See EBRD, 2002, p. 12 
96 Which reduces chances for younger to get jobs. 
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It seems that authorities lacked strenght to make necessary effort to explain to 
voters and general public the reasons for non-sustainability of present systems of 
education, health care, pension insurance and social welfare. There is still strong linkage 
beetween anticipated social safety net and state in vast majority of population, which is a 
legacy of inherited paternalism. In analogy to the absence of reforms there was no change 
in populations proclivity towards self responsibility, competition and freedom of choice 
in respect of social care, education and safety in third age. 
                   The government has used substantial means for solving acute problems and 
prevention of resentment of employees and for severance payment to workers being laid 
off97, thus with no intention of making definite institutional re-arrangement. Financial 
support to unreformed systems of education, judiciary and health care spreads disastrous 
message: wages are not linked to productivity since they can grow no matter of reform 
paucity. In these fields there was not clear break with Milosevic regime because to many 
public servants who violated laws, moral and professional standards have not lost their 
jobs and privileges. Clean up ended on ministerial and their assistants level. The lack of 
basic refinement leads to conclusion that the former violators were awarded with higher 
incomes. Status quo is preserved by additional funding of unreformed institutions.  
                   These are the reasons why enthusiasm that existed two years ago is wasted 
irrevocably, since 27% of population supports current way and pace of market reforms, 
although DOS has had political approval of more than 60%.  
                   Social policy must be aimed at establishing of conditions for sustainable 
development rather than at preserving the status quo. Clear message must be sent: the 
only efficient policy that reduces poverty is economic growth based on new jobs and 
higher productivity where social policy is targeted at safeguarding of incapable citizens. 
 
 
FOREIGN AID AND CREDITS  
 
 As one of its greatest successes the new authorities have pointed out to the 
amount of money received on various donor conferences, as aid for the revival of Serbia. 
                                                 
97 With 4bn YUD government serviced social programs of excessive labor force in 17 companies; 1.5bn 
YUD has been spent on severances for 10,000 former employees of liquidated banks; subsidies to 
companies in process of restructuring took additional 6.5bn YUD. 
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Foreign aid was partly granted as donation and partly as soft loans. The donors are mostly 
the governments of developed countries and non-market funds, such as the WB, EBRD, 
and IMF. The biggest donors are the EBRD, European commission, European Union, 
European Investment Bank and the Government of Italy.  
                   Total amount of funds agreed from the end of 2000. until June 2002. moves 
around 2.778bn Euro  439m in 2000, 1.397bn in 2001. and 942m in 2002. The transfer 
of agreed funds is postponed, compared to promises, what is illustrated in Table 4. In 
2000-2003. it is expected for 2.44bn Euro to be delivered. 
 
Table 4: Dynamics of foreign aid, in millions of Euro  
Fiscal year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2000 157.85 266.29 8.57 - 
2001 - 296.17 526.59 391.16 
2002 - - 346.09 450.11 
Total 157.85 562.46 881.25 841.27 
Source: Status report, 2002, p. 4, 7. 
 
 
Nearly all financial means in 2000. and 2001 were donations. Contrary to that, the 
proportion of donations in 2002. and 2003. will be 58%, and 26% respectively, while the 
rest will be soft loans.  
 The total amount of funds agreed whose realization will last several years (until 
2004) is close to the average annual amount of FDI in Hungary in the last ten years. The 
effects of those two cases are in reality completely different. 
 Sectorial division of donated funds is the following: the biggest amount of funds 
agreed goes to the energy branch, followed by social affairs and finances, and the rest 
goes into the private sector, health care, support to the budget, banking reform, 
agriculture, local government, etc.  
 The effect achieved can vary a lot. On the one hand, these funds are being used to 
fill in all the holes into which the private capital wouldnt have interest to flow 
(electricity), and that is good. The danger brought by the donations is the weakening of 
the motives for reform. Governments receiving funds try to satisfy interest groups and 
don't risk the loss of votes caused by eventual structural changes. Secondly, if the amount 
of money at the states disposal increases, it is increased the political and economical 
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power of the bureaucrats and the state. Thirdly, some space opens up for corruption. It is 
rather questionable what would have happened if there were no donations for the 
fulfillment of some large holes of Serbian economy, such as energetic, social affairs, 
etc.? Would the authorities be forced to speed up the reforms or would it look for 
alternative sources of money, through privatization, sales of monopolistic rights, quotas 
and licenses?  
 The fact is that the donations were used as a good base for political marketing of 
the new authorities, actually as a proof of successful leadership in domestic and foreign 
policy. However, any other post-Miloević government would also get, if not the same, 
then the approximate level of credibility in international circles, financially materialized 
through aid. The credibility awarded to the Government in the eyes of foreign 
governments and non-market funds (influenced by the governments and not by the 
markets), for political cooperativeness for example, is something completely different 
from the credibility of a country for private domestic and foreign direct investments, 
which can be achieved only through the creation of favorable conditions for investments, 
and not through some political moves. 
 Donations are economically far less efficient from the direct private investments. 
They go mostly into budgetary consumption and subsidies.98 Even when a state uses them 
for investments, their efficiency level is much lower than that of the private investment. 
Unlike donations, whose amount does significantly diminish before they reach the target 
(they diminish as a result of the costs of equipment, expert work, corruption, etc.) private 
capital brings even more advantages  increase in productivity and employment, transfer 
of know-how, increase in exports, etc.  
 So, instead of asking for aid and soft loans, the Government should work on the 
creation of good business environment, favorable for another entry of private capital, 
which will have a full range of positive effects. Trade, not aid. The things on that field, 
however, are going in a completely opposite direction. After several unsuccessful 
                                                 
98 With corruption and wrong directing of aid the social-economic effect of the donations in considerably 
smaller than the donors intended and much smaller than the authorities publicly declared. In Serbia there 
was no systematic research of the use of the donations. In the newspapers a few affairs with the use of the 
donors' aid were noted, such as the illegal sale of the fuel designated for the public heating of the town of 
Kraljevo, the missing check of 1m USD from a Greek bank, illegal sale of humanitarian aid to some 
enterprises and on the public markets. The studies done in neighboring Bosnia estimate that out of 6bn 
USD of foreign aid between 1996-2002 almost one half disappeared through corruption.   
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attempts to attract FDIs, by organizing the meetings in Belgrade for the Serbian 
businessmen living abroad and for the western businessmen and by visiting well-known 
companies abroad, Serbian Prime-minister Zoran Đinđić published an article in Glas 
javnosti99 inviting the IMF to approve substantial funds to Serbia, which would be used 
to finance the public works on the large scale.  
 After pointing out that the IMF fosters basically sensible policies, asking 
countries to promote stabilization, liberalization and disinflation and being rightfully 
strict toward most of the countries, Đinđić says that there are some specific countries 
with a specific model of transition where the IMF should essentially step away from its 
current philosophy and approve to the Government of Serbia the money for public 
works.100  Đinđić tries to delude the IMF by stating that the reforms in Serbia have gone 
too far. He promises to develop market economy in Serbia through the administrative 
measures, which is absurd, because the way to a market economy leads only through 
privatization and creation of favorable conditions for private investments, and not 
through the spreading of already dominant role of the state. Đinđić is asking for large 
public investments, active policy of employment, budgetary indebtedness for the sake of 
fostering economic growth, selective subsidies, additional protection of the domestic 
market  which are all the measures that enlarge rather than reduce the role of the state in 
the economy and which altogether fit into old communist policies that have turned the 
economies of the Eastern European countries into ruins. The proposition of the Serbian 
Prime-minister comes down to the financing of the consolidating of corrupt socialism in 
Serbia with the IMF money, i.e. the money of the western taxpayers. For now, the IMF 
has remained silent.  
 After everything that happened in Serbia between1990-2000 the western powers 
could hardly avoid assistance to the country, regardless of whether that assistance would 
come as donations, soft loans or debt cancellation. If at the same time the Serbian 
                                                 
99 Daily newspapers »Glas javnosti«, April 30 - May 2, 2002.  
100 The different approach is towards the countries in transition, where the present authorities inherited a 
destroyed economy and where a concept of administrative assistance to the economy should not be 
discarded immediately. That is the case mostly with new administration for which one should not 
automatically assume that is incompetent and corrupt. That administrative assistance to the economy would 
mirror itself in large  public investments and active policy of employment, budgetary indebtedness for the 
sake of support to the economic growth, selective subsidies, protection of some parts of the domestic 
market until the economy becomes competitive. Ibid. Đinđić, 2002.  
 58 
Government has worked on the creation of worthy conditions for private investments, 
and if it has used western aid for the financing of enlarged transactional costs of the 
reform, including the budgetary deficit unavoidable in the first two years of transition, the 
reform in Serbia could have been characterized as a very successful. As there were no 
serious reforms, one cannot avoid the impression of considerable negative influence of 
foreign aid upon the lack of reforms. Although the capability of the western countries to 
rationally use the aid was limited by the nature of the problem  it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the country that got rig of Miloević does not deserve the support  some 
ways to do that still existed. First, donors were able to separate the humanitarian aid from 
the rest of aid. Second, western governments and non-market funds were able to monitor 
the extent of reforms in Serbia. Third, if the reforms were missing, they were able to 
provide nothing beyond humanitarian aid (mostly dedicated to physical survival of the 
population); its use might be strictly controlled, as it is done during Miloevićs rule. 
Four, other donor and credit assistance should have been conditioned by overall reforms, 
rather than with a handful of conditions, operatively important but yet systematically less 
important.101     
 The Congress of the USA first noted that fallacy in the western approach, apart 
from some rare analysts. The Congress has moved to use the legislation in 2002, in order 
to request from the American administration to make its aid to Serbia conditional upon 
the reforms in Serbia. Therefore, the Senate Committee for International relations 
requested that Serbia, if it wants to get 115m USD of aid in 2003, has to look upon a 
more serious break with Miloevićs legacy: The Committee notes, however, that while 
Miloević has been out of office since October 5, 2000, many of his  unfortunate legacies  
continue, including an unreformed State security apparatus and military, a politicized 
judiciary, and political and financial support to hardliners in Bosnia's Republic Srpska 
and northern Kosovo.102 Apart from that, the Senate quotes the pressure upon the media, 
weak cooperation with the ICTY and the lack of economic reforms as the reasons for this 
conditioning. If this kind of opinion would have prevailed in the West from the very 
                                                 
101 If there were systematic changes the cooperation of the Serbian authorities with the ICTY, the end of 
assistance to the Bosnian Serb Army and repatriation of the prisoners between Serbia and Kosovo would 
not be a problem.  
102 Citation from the material »U.S. assistance in 2003«.  
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beginning of the structural assistance to Serbia, it would exercise a strong pressure upon 
the authorities in Belgrade to speed up reforms. Of course, there are no guarantees that 
the authorities in Belgrade would go for the reform even in that case, but at least the 
incentives to do that would be much bigger. Although some chances for this kind of 
change were lost, it is still not too late for that. 
 A special episode of foreign aid is so-called technical assistance, which consists 
in providing the intellectual services to a recipient country. It seems that these forms of 
assistance are more efficient the more precisely their purpose is determined, the more 
their providers take into account informal rules in the targeted country, the more precisely 
their aims, target groups and objectives are determined and the bigger the competition for 
getting the funds is. The least useful projects are those where the consultant companies 
define unrealistic aims in order to influence the domestic politicians when it comes to 
some legislative solutions and public policies, which of course ends up as one big 
nothing. Those kinds of promises are often just a mask to waste the money, where it 
emerges a cartel of foreign consultants, diplomats, some domestic politicians and parts of 
the domestic press and the NGO sector. After the assistance ends up, foreign consultants 
go back enriched, domestic politicians and foreign diplomats are happy because they got 
the money for cooperation and the problem remains where it was. These consultant-
diplomatic-political ties spread a negative way of thinking, because all of the terms such 
as the market, competition and entrepreneurial initiative are proscribed, and actually 
dominating program is the one of Government, connections, coteries, corruption, which 
has nothing to do with the declared aims of the technical assistance. Therefore, some of 
these programs bring nothing but the damage, because instead of the development of the 
spirit of personal responsibility and market democracy under the rule of law, they support 
the arrogance of bureaucrats, ignorant consultants (who often dont know the basic facts 













                 The FMC authors do not share two widespread views regarding corruption. 
First, that corruption consists in misuse of public positions in purpose of gaining private 
profit only. Second, corruption is not predominantly a moral problem.  
                   Talk about corruption often refers to corruption in the state administration, 
and the WB adopts such a definition. Nevertheless, corruption is a broader issue. It 
occurs in all cases when principal-agent relationship exists, and the agent is able to 
privatize or sell illegally certain rights since principal is not able to control sufficiently 
the behavior of agent.103 Due to market pressure, the level of corruption is rather low in 
the private firms or their associations. Since there is no such kind of pressure in the 
public sector, corruption is mainly the problem in state administration. 
                   Related to the second point, corruption is immoral in normative sense, but 
this is not its main property. In positive sense, corruption is a mere consequence of the 
agents rational behavior under circumstances.   
                   Similar to thieving or rent seeking, corruption does not create new goods, but 
just redistribute the existing ones. Instead to be used for productive purposes, resources 
are wasted in unproductive activities.  
                   Adherents of the normative approach plea for tight laws and their strict 
enforcement, for imposition of moral codes, rigorous control of public officers, public 
awareness campaigns, and creating special governments departments as a tool for 
fighting corruption. They neglect that corruption that way may be only slightly, but not 
seriously reduced. As long as rents exist, there will be those to capture them, and the 
level of corruption will remain approximately the same. On the other hand, positive 
approach to corruption emphasizes the change of incentives and rents reducing. In 
practice it means taking the government apart from the economy (deregulation, 
privatization), restraining bureaucracy, and eliminating corruption-generating 
mechanisms. In order to develop specific anti-corruption tools the concrete, case study-
approach is needed. If some administrative procedures are complex, they should be 
eliminated or simplified. If bureaucrats have a lot of room for exercising discretionary 
                                                 
103 See Colombatto 2001; Prokopijević 2002; Tasić 2002; 
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power, the extent of that power should be restricted. If only one bureaucrat is in charge 
for certain procedure, alternatives should be provided, avoiding employment of new 
bureaucrats, but letting different incumbents be in charge for various seals or approvals. 
However, these moves will remain without significant result, if they are not accompanied 
by improved transparency of operation in the state and in its agencies, with more 
efficient judiciary, and greater incentives to denunciate corruption. Positive approach 
insists on increasing the price and decreasing the profit from corruption.  
                   Corruption is widespread in Serbia, which places this country at the very top 
among the European countries.104 Corruption and gray market have developed 
significantly during 1990ies as collateral of the UN economic sanctions, imposed to 
Serbia and FRY. Transparency International ranked Serbia on 90th place out of 99 
countries in 1999, with the index of 2.0, and on 89th place out of 90 countries in 2000, 
with the index of 1.3.105 Global Corruption Report for 2001 does not include Serbia. 
Serbia (FRY) is not on the official TI list for 2002,106 but by the unofficial one it is 
ranked 93rd out of 126 countries, with the index of 2.6. It is an improvement compared to 
2000, but still very poor result. Serbia is not ranked by the Opacity Index in 2001, done 
by Price Waterhouse & Coopers, that encompasses around 60 countries in the world. 
This and the absence from the TI lists is a signal that firms  are not interested to invest in 
Serbia, so that they are not willing to order the research from the TI. (TI researches have 
been undertaken during Miloevićs regime because political interest of many 
governments and international organizations existed.) According to the study Nations in 
Transit, which measures the corruption level on the scale from 1 (the lowest) to 7 (the 
highest), FRY is ranked among the worst off countries with the score 6.25, together with 
                                                 
104 In spite of common assumption that there was no corruption during Titos regime, this conviction 
obviously is not true, because some classes lived far above the standard they could have afforded by their 
offi cial incomes at the time. Corruption existed on the top bureaucracy level, whose obedience was 
purchased by extra-incomes and gi fts the regime enabled them to obtain, as well as in the some business 
transactions. It was not written much on corruption then, and even if somebody was accused for corruption, 
it meant that he made a political mistake, and corruption was often an excuse for charging him. Similar 
practice has been continued under Miloevićs regime, during which vigorous boom of corruption occurred. 
While under Tito centralized systematic, grand corruption and small corruption were moderate, Miloević 
centralized grand corruption, but small corruption was decentralized and widespread.         
105 The TI scale assigns the index 10 if there is no corruption and the index 0 if corruption is omnipresent. 
106 At least three independent inquiries are needed to be included in the list, while for FRY and Serbia, only 
two were performed. 
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Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.107 Researches undertaken by Serbian 
NGOs show that corruption is widespread in Serbia, which places the county among the 
2 or 3 worst off in Europe.  
                   Fight against corruption is exacerbated by several factors. The authorities 
announced to fight corruption, but they did nothing in reality, because it is a source of 
their revenues. Second, normative, moralistic comprehension of corruption prevails in 
public, which makes the fight more difficult. Third, there is a little experience of the 
citizens, NGOs and the others with fighting corruption under transition conditions, with 
pathologies inherited from previous era. Forth, the width of the phenomenon creates 
feelings of omnipresence of corruption and helplessness of the people. Wrong 
comprehension that corruption is acceptable when salaries are low takes place. Salaries  
are low in the private firms as well,  but corruption is not there because of market pressure 
and different incentives.  
                   Within the Anti-corruption strategy in Serbia, presented in September 2001, 
the Council and Operative initiatives started. Under the Operative initiative Committee 
for Fight against Corruption, Anti-corruption teams, and Special Teams have been 
formed. Under the Council initiative, the Council for fight against corruption has been 
created. Due to wrong orientation to the moral aspects of the campaign and constraining 
the campaign to verbal level only, Governments actions remained without any result. 
There are no institutional changes, which are the only real strategy in fighting corruption. 
Almost all institutions of the previous system notorious for corruption survived, while 
new corruption-generating institutions are created, like the extra-profit Law, Fund for 
guaranties, Agency for small and middle-size enterprises, NSI, tenders with more than 
one criterion, monopoly laws (oil, games on chance, tobacco). Among the anti-corruption 
measures undertaken by the Serbian and Yugoslav Government are to be found market 
liberalization, import-export liberalization (especially canceling the system of licenses  
and quotas), cancellation of double exchange rate, more transparent budget (although not 
transparent enough yet).  
                                                 
107 See, Nations in Transit, p. 31, on the web site Freedom House. 
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                   Because of wrong strategy of the Government and some NGOs in the 
anti-corruption strategy conceiving, costs of corruption rather increase than decrease, 
since the costs of anti-corruption campaign are now added to them. Namely, moralistic 
pressure for reducing corruption induces greater bewares of bureaucrats, and greater 
expenditures for fighting corruption.  
                   Why does the campaign exist at all? Probably to pursue two important 
interests  politicians interest to continue to collect bribes and the interest of voters, 
some social groups and NGOs which want something to be done in fighting  
corruption. This campaign is aimed to make an illusion that there is a fight against 
corruption, and to change nothing in fact, even to worsen108 the situation, because the 
alibi of ongoing campaign now exists. It does not mean that some small fishes will not 
be caught for corruption, it is even possible that establishment sacrifices some big fish 
in order to get public alibi for enriching itself.  
 
C. POLITICS, STATE AND LEGAL SYSTEM  
 
                   Miloević failed to establish a classical dictatorship due to several reasons. 
First, Montenegro was defined as particular federal state, and after several years of 
support to his power, the Montenegro authorities have withdrawn it in 1997. Second, 
Milosevics party (SPS) has never obtained majority on elections in Serbia (with 
exception of elections in 1990), and coalition partners had been necessary for government 
forming.109 Third, opposition parties, independent media, NGOs and citizens' initiatives  
existed in Serbia. Fourth, opposition coalition "Together" won elections in around 20 
biggest cities in Serbia in 1996. Fifth, since the end of the cold-war, international 
environment for dictatorships has worsened in Europe, so FRY and Belarus functioned as  
                                                 
108 Some NGOs like Resistance (Ser. Otpor) aimed their campaigns at developing consciousness, more 
stringent laws, better control, which are all actions that can only prolong the existing situation. The 
movement  Resistance contributed greatly to getting rid of Miloević. Thereafter, it fell victim of internal 
disputes that led to its dissolution into several fractions, and some its leaders were alleged for corruption in 
the press. (The same happened with the Government of Serbia Council for fighting corruption, which after 
a year of existence has not done anything noticeable yet. In the meantime, Slobodan Beljanski, the 
Chairman of the Council, has resigned in June 2002, and several other members announced a similar 
move.) 
109 That was New Democracy (ND) and Serbian Radical Party (SRS)  
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quasi-dictatorships. Sixth, Miloević succeeded until 1997 to escape direct confrontation 
with international community, and got support from some major powers. After 1997, 
Miloević entered the confrontation, and instead of the "guarantor of peace in 
Balkans,110 he became "the international pariah" and the "Balkan butcher". The UN 
sanctions and the NATO military intervention in 1999 definitely weakened economic and 
politic basis of his power, fastening his fall. 
                   Due to high costs of his politics, activities of the Serbian opposition 
supported by the Western democratic forces, and quoted limitations, Milosevic lost 
elections in 2000 and  for some time it seemed that idyllic existed between new 
government and society. Immediately before and after their arrival to power the DOS 
politicians put high on their agenda: a country reintegration into world, separation of 
power, independence of judiciary, state decentralization (including Vojvodina 
autonomy), solving problems with Montenegro, good status for minority rights, 
independence of media, the autonomy of university, freedom of association and fast and 
deep economic reforms. Later actions were not conform to these promises. 
 
Country reintegration into the world 
 
                   Only insignificant part of the announced changes found its way to practice. 
Some spheres were not touched, from reform not to speak at all. FRY and Serbia became 
members of some international organizations, although not of several important ones. At 
the end of 2000, FRY and Serbia became UN and OECD members, and at the beginning 
of 2001 relations with IMF, WB, EBRD were re-established. During 2001, Serbia and 
FRY became members of BIS (Bank of International Settlement), CEI (Central European 
Initiative), ILO (International Labor Organization) and WIPO (World Intellectual 
Property Organization). In June 2001, negotiations with former Yugoslav republics about 
succession were completed, and in the fall of the same year, negotiations with the Paris 
                                                 
110 For example, until the summer 1997, USA implicitly supported Miloević, and it was obvious when 
they allowed Serbian "Telecom" sale to Greek and Italian companies for 1bn USD, although Serbia was 
under partial UN sanctions. This transaction was probably compensation for Miloević's signing of the 
Dayton Agreement and it could not be possible without USA support. After 1997, American policy toward 
Miloević was substantially changed culminating in the NATO intervention in FRY during 1999. 
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Club resulted in writhing off some 2/3 out of  4.7bn USD large debt, while the rest 1/3 of 
debt was reprogrammed. From October 2000 to June 2002 Serbia spent 1.2bn USD of the 
foreign donations and credits mostly collected on the donor conference in June 2001. 
Even two years after changes took place, FRY has not become a member of the CE 
(Council of Europe) and WTO (World Trade Organization), and it failed to enter 
negotiations or on the Stabilization and Association with the EU and to enter NATOs 
Partnership for Peace.111 With the ICTY,112 FRY has established only partial cooperation 
about extradition of indicted individuals by opening the office in Belgrade and through 
selective access of the ICTY to certain documents. Even this cooperation is the result of 
great pressure on FRY and treats that financial aid would be withdrawn.  
 
Separation of Powers and Judiciary   
 
                   Instead of division of powers, new leaders started a passionate race for 
getting control over state and its agencies, preserving old constitution and laws 
proclaimed under Miloević. Two years after the change of government, Đinđić controls 
the Serbian government, while Kotunica controls the Army and Federal government. 
Both leaders share the conviction that separation of powers would restrict their 
prerogatives. Consequently, the huge majority of previous legislation stayed enacted, 
nearly nothing had been nullified, while the new laws, although they have passed 
necessary procedure, were not implemented in real life.   
Except for insufficient number of promulgated laws that threat state organization 
and judiciary, a great problem is the lack of necessary institutional changes that would 
provide efficient implementation of promulgated laws and a legal framework for changes.  
Keeping in mind the lack of institutional reform that was necessary to change 
rules and incentives, no wonder that the substantial changes in legal and political field are 
still missing: the reconstruction of constitution has not even attempted; political system is 
not changed, as  well as the electoral system. Basic characteristics of constitutional and 
                                                 
111 Although relations' improvement, until October 2002, FRY and Serbia have not became members in 
"Partnership for Peace", and so there is no point to discuss eventual entrance into NATO.  
112 International tribunal for prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of human right in ex-
Yugoslavia between 1990-1999.  
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legal system established during ten years of national-socialist regime are still unchanged: 
so called "socially owned property" still exists as constitutional category; division of 
power and independent judiciary principles have not realized; power is manly 
concentrated in executive branch. The main reasons for hesitation of the ruling elite to 
reconstruct the whole society and to give up a huge discretionary power consists in 
privileges it exploits from that (personal enrichment, exercise of power and control of all 
segments of social life).      
                   After changes took place, judiciary is less instrumental in comparison with 
Miloević era, but still far away from getting real independence. Legal system reform and 
the rule of law, as important economic reform presumptions, have been just started with 
five judiciary laws. Additional problem consists in temporary lack of coordination 
between legal and economic reforms. Administration of justice reform, mainly judiciary 
reform, aimed to organizational, personal, financial, expert and technical training for 
efficient and qualitative proceeding with documents about economic reforms, contract 
parties relations, property rights and creditors protection, had no results. Five laws have 
passed legislation on January 1, 2002 (Law on Court Organization, Law on Public 
Prosecutors' Office, Law on Judges, Law on Administration of Justice High Council, Law 
on Court and Public Prosecutor's Offices Headquarters and Jurisdiction); however, these 
laws were never enforced. These laws were proposed to enable modern, rational and 
appropriate courts organization. They aimed to decentralize courts system according to 
future regionalization and decentralization; to change commercial courts status and 
organization that have to broaden their authority; to develop mechanisms of checking 
judges dignity; and to establish mechanisms for judiciary independence greater 
guarantee. Special innovations in these laws should be: judiciary and judges  
independency strengthening, establishing of special body for personnel selection - 
Administration of Justice High Council; independence guarantee by new way of cases 
allocation to judges; systematic organization, new court categories and their real 
jurisdiction. Juridical administration reform is reduced to five judiciary laws, and its 
serious implementation has to happen soon. By now, the basic legal framework113 have 
                                                 
113 In order to complete this field, it is necessary to change process laws. For example, Law on legal 
procedure (system still favors debtors that may unlimitedly drag out court procedures, causing long suites 
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been composed only, institutions can not implement it, and it is necessary to work on 
administration and increasing of juridical institution capacity for interpretation and 
implementation in a predictable, efficient, and transparent manner. 
                   If the five laws passed in 2001 can be characterized as a step forward, 
although they have not been implemented, Serbian government launched some changes  
in the middle of 2002, that all can be considered as a step back concerning good reform 
direction. This changes provoked immediate reaction of experts and judges: "New 
changes and amendments on judicial administration laws set are dangerous for judiciary 
independence and suspend legal authority."114 According to these changes, 
Administration of Justice High Council are excluded from the process of appointing 
judges (this body should provide judiciary political independency) and Serbian 
parliament appoints judges, or more exactly, the parliamentary council of justice. Court 
presidents should not work on cases, and they so become regime officials and a channel 
of political influence on court, just like in Miloević and Tito era. Minister of justice, 
court president, and Supreme Court president control the process of firing judges, and 
minister of justice announces the application for court president. These changes are 
adopted by the Serbian government, although they were not discussed in the appropriate 
parliamentary council (although they should be), what is a precedent illustrating the 
adherence and commitment of the Government to the rule of law.  
Decentralization 
 
                   Serbia under Miloević is centralized, repealing autonomous regions  
competences, depriving municipalities' property and concentrating all power in the same 
hands. Therefore, decentralization has been one of the priorities after "changes" and the 
DOS leaders have promised it zealously. However, real steps toward country 
decentralization were insufficient or wrongly conducted.  
                                                                                                                                                 
with great possibilities for different influences to judges) and Law on executive proceeding, due to effici ent 
implementing of court decision that dissimulate economic activities. Illustration of present situation in this 
filed it is necessary 40 days to get permissions and licenses; late payment of debt allows 8 weeks, and 
implementing court procedure lasts 40 weeks. 
114 Vera upica, member of Governing Council of Serbian Judges Association in the newspapers Danas: 
Roknić (2002), p. 5.  
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                   For example, media, police, and military pressure on Montenegro, well 
known in the period 1997-2000 stopped and this is a positive achievement. However, 
paternalism towards Montenegro and weaker pressures continue to persist. Although the 
governing parties in Montenegro opted for independence, one stream of the DOS 
gathered around president Kotunica was for the creation of federal state, while Đinđić's 
block was very heterogeneous both containing supporters of the federation and supporters 
of independent Serbia and Montenegro. NBY and its Governor were often pressing 
Montenegrin monetary authorities to introduce dinar again and abandon euro. Moreover, 
the DOS does not have Democratic Party of Socialist (DPS) but Socialist Populist Party 
(SNP) as a coalition partner in the Federal Parliament, although SNP has been an 
opposition in Montenegro and it was Miloević's ally since the start of disobedience of 
Montenegrin authorities to Miloević.  
                  The representatives of Serbia and Montenegro did not managed to redefine the 
relationships between two federal states, so the EU representatives joined the negotiations 
and offered the compromise. The Belgrade Agreement was signed in March 2002 and its 
basic principles are in accordance with the Serbian demands for the international 
subjectivity and certain common spheres of the future state, but the EU rejected other 
Serbian demands for strengthening of the federal state.115  This rejection was concession 
to the Montenegrin side. This meant that new state would have just a few competences 
with the veto right for both states. On the other side, it was rejected Montenegrin demand 
for the union of the two independent and internationally recognized states without single 
representative in the UN, IMF, WB and the Council of Europe. The duration of the 
Agreement is limited to three years and after this period expires each of the units would 
be allowed to opt out.  This approach of the EU, tacitly supported by the USA, is an 
                                                 
115 New state, Serbia and Montenegro has not the government, but the council of ministers with five posts: 
1) foreign affair 2) national defense, 3) economic foreign affairs, 4) economic internal affairs and 5) human 
and minority rights. It is obvious that new state looks like a club, rather then an unit, because it has no 
common market, tax, custom, and monetary systems. After three years, any club member may leave the 
club and obtain independence. 
120 There are many exceptions in this group, so for example, UNECE (2002, p. 5) does not rank Serbia and 
FRY at all, in respect to credit capability. The investment grade list of the UNECE is based on two other 
lists, composed by private companies (Fitch and S & P), rather than on the basis of political convevniences, 
what is usuall among international organizations and non-market funds.  
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obvious attempt to stop the disintegration process and to delay border reshaping8.  After 
the signing of the Belgrade Agreement in March 2002, the negotiations between Serbia 
and Montenegro about the text of the future Constitutional Charter continued in the 
following months. Instead the parity commissions named by the two parliaments and 
foreseen by the Belgrade Agreement, the negotiation was conducted by the governments 
of Serbia and Montenegro, in obvious effort to prevent the loss of the international rents 
(credits). At the beginning of October 2002, when we are writing this report, the 
Constitutional Charter is still unfinished. 
                   When it was a part of the SFRY, Serbia had two autonomous regions  
Vojvodina and Kosovo. These regions enjoyed significant autonomy since 1974, which 
was revoked in 1990, when Serbia became a unitary state. After the NATO intervention 
in 1999, Kosovo  was practically excluded from Serbia. The UN resolution No.1244, 
ending up the NATO intervention, states that Kosovo is a part of FRY but not a part of 
Serbia. Kosovo is currently under protection and governance of the UN and its future is 
uncertain. Possible alternatives for future status of Kosovo are: a) independence b) 
joining to Albania c) division between Serbia and Albania d) reintegration in Serbia, but 
without any Serbian competences over it.   
                   Re-establishment of the autonomy for Vojvodina might have been the test for 
DOS, but it passed this test with very limited success. Instead of giving substantial 
autonomy to Vojvodina with the original competences (as it was promised in the DOS's 
election campaign in 2000), so called Omnibus legislation was  promulgated in the 
beginning of 2002. By this legislation the authorities in Belgrade delegated a part of its 
own powers and funds on the Parliament and Government of Vojvodina. The process of 
collecting revenues for the Serbian budget and their transfer to the Vojvodina authorities 
is contrary to the very idea of autonomy. A separate question is, does this correspond to 
the demands of the autonomy. The Government of Vojvodina got the competences in 
education, health care, judiciary, culture, social insurance, urbanism, energy supply, 
agriculture, but it got no responsibility for taxation and privatization. When this Omnibus 
Law was promulgated, it was said that its provisos would start to apply in autumn 2002, 
but there has been no indication about real progress in implementation.  
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                   In the light of the preceding solutions, the Law on Local Self-Governance 
may be considered as the success of the new regime, although it has significant 
shortcomings. Positive effects of the law are that municipalities got slightly broader 
competences and the expenditures on the local level grow from 10% to 16-17% as 
percentage of the total state expenditures in Serbia. Competences are exclusively local,  
while elementary education, preventive health care and some other fields may be 
delegated from the republic to the local level, but it is not mandatory. The experience is  
that the higher levels are reluctant to transfer competences on the lower level if the 
transfer is not prescribed by law.  Mayors are to be elected directly, but their prerogatives 
are seriously limited by the prerogatives of the other municipality bodies. Defects of this 
law are that implementation acts have not been promulgated. It is unexplainable why 
central authorities have not given back the property to municipalities taken by Miloević 
in 1996, who did so anticipating the victory of the coalition "Together" on the local 
elections. There is no reasonable explanation why this property is not back to 
municipalities: it was enough to nullify the law. Another bed aspect of the law is that 
there is no possibility for the municipality to influence the tax rates of certain taxes, such 
as income tax, turnover tax, and corporative income tax. This would be the way to create 
"fiscal federalism" i.e. a competition between municipalities, which would increase the 
attractiveness of Serbia as a whole for the private investments. 
                   About some other aspects of the decentralization, such as status of Sandak, 
the positions of towns there was no debate after "changes". 
 
The other laws and initiatives 
 
                   In addition to what is already mentioned, there were some other unsuccessful 
laws and draft laws. Law on University is technically bed and that is not only because it 
has 149 articles, like some constitutions, but also because it is too detailed and repeats 
that University is scientific instead educational institution.10 The Law is discriminative, 
strongly favoring state over private universities. Furthermore, there is a discretionary 
power for the commission (composed of the professors from the state universities) to set 
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the conditions that private universities have to fulfill as well as to approve or reject their 
programs. This is clear conflict of interests.  
                   Another example of the reforms lagging is a very limited and partial reform 
of the public administration. The whole reform may be summed in establishing the 
Agency for Public Administration Development and The Council for Public 
Administration. So far, there is only the Law on Security Intelligence Agency. Files from 
the secret police archives have been opened very selectively and the majority of 
individuals that were surveyed by secret police did not want to go and check their files. 
The full disclosure is the real test of the first forthcoming reform government.  
                   Serbian government was governing by decrees during 2001-2002 and brought 
more decrees than all Miloević's governments in ten years. It was not in hurry with the 
transformation of the legal system, because it benefited from the broad prerogatives 
inherited from the Miloević era, like huge concentration of power and getting rich. 
Generally, reforms can hardly be conducted without constitutional changes and adequate 
legislation. For such an effort, Serbia is lacking the political will.  
 
D. THE POSITION OF THE COUNTRY IN THE WORLD 
 
                   There is an almost shocking difference in appreciation of economic and 
political situation  in Serbia after changes took place when one considers private 
investors and business on the one side, and the state officials, diplomats, international 
organizations and non-market funds on the other side. Private investors, funds and think-
tanks have estimated in general the reforms in Serbia as insufficient, bad, and even 
disastrous, while, apart from that, international organizations,120 some governments and 
non-market funds estimated the situation in range from good to tolerable. The 
explanation is very simple. 
                   Governments, organizations and non-market funds have given better marks 
because of political intrest, what has nothing to do with reforms and real situation in 
Serbia. For the help to the government of Serbia they did not spend their money, but the 
money of tax-payers. Contrary to that , private investors, companies, funds and think-
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tanks directly take the risk of their estimations, their investments are comercial and that is 
why it is in their interest to be realistic.                    
                   There were many favorable appreciations of the reforms in Serbia from some 
governments, ambassadors in Belgrade, representatives of the IMF, EBRD, EU and WB, 
but we cite here just one typical: «I am convinced that we are going to witness a 
significant inflow of foreign direct investment in Yugoslavia in forthcoming months. ... A 
number of investors will come here, with the main American investors among them. (...) 
It is true that investors take care a lot the political stability and economic situation. But, 
your team did excellent job and it has laid down grounds for a stable economy. For that 
reason, I am the optimist.»121 There was a number of statements of that type, even several 
from the cited author, but from investments not a bit. Investors would come, provided 
there is a suitable environment for doing business.   
                   In the remainder, we will be confined to some estimations which are either 
realistic or controversial, because of contradiction they contain. 
                   The example of a controversial estimation is EBRD (2002), which 
emphasizes «a coherent approach to transition and reform» (p. 4) of the Serbian and 
Yugoslav authorities, «/A/gressive reforms, to which the authorities have already shown 
their strong commitment...»122 (p. 4), but it is still underlined that the reforms are «at the 
early stage of transition» (p. 4). If it is so, the results are to be expected. But, instead of 
that, the EBRD says: «Now that reforms have taken hold and relations with the 
international community have been restored, the potential exists for a strong rebound 
over the medium term. In the short term, however, economic growth is likely to be 
constrained by the legacy of dilapidated and obsolete infrastructure, lack of working 
                                                 
121 William Montgomery, the U.S. ambassador in Yugoslavia in his interview for daily Danas, in: Jaukovic 
2002, p. IV.  
122 EBRD adds: »  A comprehensive and fast reform programme has been embarked upon aimed at 
establishing, after a long period of authoritarian rule, a democratic system based on the rule of law.« (s. 3) 
It is interesting where EBRD finds such phenomena, although the presidency of DOS rather than the 
Parliament takes crucial decisions, although the Government creates the members of Parliament as it likes 
that, although the Serbian Government and the majority in authority skip to enforce court decisions when 
their verdicts are not suitable for them. In addition, there still have not been any reforms in attorney, in the 
police and in the court system. The year 2001, the first year of a new political and economic system, saw 
remarkable progress in transition in FRY. (ibid, p. 4, underlined by the editor). It would be nice to reveal 
where are a new system and a remarkable progress.   
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capital, unclear ownership and depleted level of social capital and institutional 
development.» (p. 13)  
                   Estimates of the «Economist Intelligence Unit» are more realistic what 
concerns wording, but they are very unrealistic in growth figures. The EIU emphasizes a 
«slow progress»  in the sphere of  technical economic politics and adds: Privatization is 
a difficult area, but impetus is building up here too. More problematic are flanking 
reforms in such areas as law and order, and coorporate government, without which the  
tehnical economic reforms will not have full impact. Progress in this area is extremely 
slow, and full resolution of these issues may take decades rather than years. (...) A key 
underlying problem in all this is that the economy now largely revolves around foreign 
aid, which provides finance but offers no technology transfer, which is what the country 
needs most.»123 The EIU emphasizes «the impressive price stability» and it says that the 
greatest risks for macroeconomic stability are in decline of  foreign aid and revenues  
from privatization.124 
                   «Freedom House» in the «Nations in Transit» for 2001 rankes 27 transition 
countries according to the degree of democracy, the rule of law and economic 
liberalization. FRY shares 18-19th place according to the degree of democracy, 22-23rd in 
respect to the rule of law and it is 22nd in respect to the economic liberalization.125 
According to all of the three markers FRY is the very last among 15 transition countries 
in Central and East Europe.   
                   In the period from 1994 - 2001. FRY ( and Serbia) has not been ranked on the 
list of economic freedom created by «Heritage Foundation» and «The Wall Street 
Journal». For the first time FRY has been ranked  in 2002. and it got 144th place out of 
155 places, with 4.05 index points. According to the degree of economic freedom FRY 
belongs to the very last , fourth group of  countries with «not-free economy».126 The 
                                                 
123 EIU, July 2002, p. 3.  
124 EIU, July 2002, p. 12.  
125 See  Nations in transit 2001, p. 25, Freedom House web site. The research includes period from 
October 31, 2001, so for FRY it was estimated only the degree of democracy after getting rid of Miloević, 
but not other changes which occurred later on.  
126 With 1 (one) marking the highest, and 5 (five) representing the lowest level of economic freedom. See 
www.heritage.org  On the top of the list is Hong-Kong (1st place, index 1.35), Singapore (2nd, 1.55), New 
Zealand (3rd, 1.70), Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Great Britain, The Netherlands and The USA (4-8th, all 
1.80). Among the countries in transition, apart from already mentioned Estonia, the best ranked are Czech 
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index is based on 50 indicators, arranged into 10 groups, and for the index of 2002 
concerned, the data stem from the period untill July 2001. However, even when the new 
index for 2003 appears, the position of FRY will not be improved, due to negligible 
reforms it did. Out of the ten counted components, which are taken into account when the 
index is reckoned, FRY got the highest  marks in fiscal burden of the government ( 2.5), 
state intervention in economy, the level of freedom in setting prices (3.0). For trade 
politics, banking and finance, property rights, FRY got 4.0. In monetary policy, capital 
flows and FDI, regulation, grey market, FRY got the lowest mark (5.0).  
                   According to the ' Index', it seems that reforms in FRY and Serbia are only to 
come. Since there are not prosperous countries under index of  2.70 ( it means that all 
developed and fast growing countries are under 45th place on the list), it is certain that the 
way to that society leads through fast and deep changes towards free market. 
                   FRY and Serbia are not ranked on the list of economic freedom worked out 
by the «Fraser Institute» from Vancouver, which is considered to be the most important 
in the world, along with the Heritage list. Private investors pay much attention to these 
lists, so with that and with bad business environment  in Serbia, one can explain why the 
country is not ranked well in respect to «investment grade» among private investors and 
companies in the world.  
                   Among the rare companies and think tanks ranking Serbia and FRY, usual 
marks are CCC, DDD, 6d or C3, which are the lowest marks in their ranking sistems. For 
example, famous U.S. data base for investors, «Dun and Bradstreet», ranks FRY in 2002 
at the very last place among 24 ranked transition countries. FRY is graded for 6d.127 No 
significant flow of FDI can be expected until a country comes to the marks BaB, Baa2 or 
at least BBB, B1 and similar, which are the marks of better but not the best transition 
countries. It is important to notice that these marks reflect the (un)conveniences for 
private investment rather than issues like political cooperation of the country in 
international relations, credibility of government  to take credits on international market, 
or fine work of bureaucracy. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Republic and Hungary (32nd and 33rd, both 2.40), and the worst off ranked are Tajikistan, Ukraine (137th 
and 138th, both 3.85), Bosnia (140th, 3.90) and FRY (144th, 4.05). Among the ex-SFRY, Slovenia is 79th, 
with 3.10, Macedonia 97th, with 3.25 and Croatia 108th, with 3.40. 
 
127 Dun & Bradsteet ranks Slovenia and Hungary on the first place. Croatia is graded 4d and ranked 4th.  
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                   There is only one way how to improve the economic position of Serbia, and 
that leads via improvement in the rule of law and further liberalization of the market. If 
the significant changes in that direction were made, the improvement would be almost 
immediately felt by better ranking on country-lists, and confirmed by private investors 
through larger flow of investments.  
 
E. GENERAL EVALUATION OF REFORMS 
 
                   Serbia has demonstrated its immaturity and inability to solve its problems on 
its own. The country has bankrupted at the beginning of 1990-ies, the international 
community was induced to arbitrate in disputes emerging from dissolution of former 
SFRY (including military interventions in Bosnia and on Kosovo), in mediating 
negotiations among ex-Yugoslav countries related to a fair division of inherited common 
goods, in mediating between Serbia and Montenegro over their common government. 
Finally, the international community has used stick and carrot policy to encourage 
Serbian leadership for cooperation with the ICTY of in the region. Inability to perceive 
some type of a market democracy under the rule of law as the main reform objective 
belongs to mentioned immaturity as well.  
                   It is probably not realistic to expect enthusiastic market reforms in Serbia 
comparable to those in Estonia128 or Hungary. Even if one accepts such a position, it 
would be difficult to explain, why then a more moderate reform is missing too, like that 
in Slovakia or Bulgaria. It is true that reforms cannot be implemented overnight, but it is  
also clear that a commitment for reforms does not need months to be shown. Even such a 
commitment to reforms is missing in Serbia.  
                   After changes in 2000 took place, a number of independent experts from 
Milosevic era got important official positions, and this woke up hopes in fast and deep 
                                                 
128 It is sometimes said, Serbia was in diffi cult position in 2000, and such countries cannot conduct 
enthusiastic reforms. This is a wrong argument, since some transition countries were in a worse position 
when started reforms, like Estonia: But after 50 years of Soviet occupation, Estonia was in ruins. Our 
economy was a shambles, the spirit of our people spoiled by the socialist heritage. Shops were empty of 
goods and money no longer had any value. Fuel prices rose by more than 10,000% over one year, while 
inflation was running more than 1,000% per annum. People stood for hours and hours in lines to buy food. 
Laar, 2002, p. 4. Situation in Estonia in 1991 was apparently inferior to that in Serbia 2000. However, the 
Estonian leaders were committed to reforms, while the Serbian ones were not.   
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reforms. This, however, never happened, since these experts have accepted socialist 
legacy and even became their apologists129 in the meantime.  
                It is not easy to publicize such moves in larger media today, since the 
government controls media130 in Serbia in a very similar way Milosevic did it. No 
wonder that the government tries to marginalize critical experts, since they are unison in 
evaluating reforms. It prevails general conviction among them, that transition is still 
missing, and this is the reason for why after coup in 2000 there was none encouraging 
economic trend131, that macroeconomic trends in FRY are unfavorable132, that there 
was no reforms in Serbia in 2002,133 and that improvement may not be expected before 
structural changes are undertaken.134  
                   In euphoria about reintegration of Serbia into international community and 
in providing assistance for the country to avert a humanitarian disaster in winter 
2000/2001, the impact of foreign aid was neglected by and large. Foreign aid was  
conditioned by some political objectives rather than by reforms. Claims for further 
democratic reforms, implementation of the rule of law (including reforms of state 
agencies, army and police) were missing. Aid providers have not asked for deeper 
economic reforms. Foreign financial aid has just replaced bankrupted central planning. 
Politicians have used it to please interest groups while buying time in office.  
                                                 
129 Especially characteristic is the case of experts from Group 17 (G17), which were critical to Miloevićs 
system, but which accepted his system with the modest changes and so forgot their initial economic 
program from 1996. That program was not a blessing of free market, but nevertheless, it represent ed a 
basically market philosophy with heavy regulation. G17 became in the meantime a rent seeking and 
opportunistic group, being publicly silent about wrong policy moves.  
130 This has already become an issue for rel evant organizations, like Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, SEEMO, and even for the U.S. Congress.  
131 Prof. dr. Ljubomir Madar, in: Barjaktarević (2002), p. 1.  
132 Raičević & uković (Ed)(2002), Forward, p. 7.  
133 By talking about influence of political instability on reforms, Vladimir Gligorov writes: Parliamentary 
bodies are not respected, and political opponents get all kinds of labels. That, in my opinion, will not 
endanger reforms, which are next to nonexistent this year, but it will prolong and enhance political 
instability. Gligorov 2002a, p. IV. Our italics.  
134 Cf. columns by Dr. Milan Kovačević in daily Blic. Cf. also articles in press written by members of the 
FMC. 
136 The slogan Serbia on the right path irresistible reminds on Scandiaconsult on the right path:  In 
1999 Scandiaconsult adopted a business plan for the period 2000-2004. This plan was implemented 
throughout the company during 2000 in a project known as On the right path. Citation from the site: 
http://www.scc.se/english/strategic_focus/index.shtml Serbian government has not reacted when the daily 
Danas (Today) has published a FMC article, in August 2002, about apparent theft. Instead, the Serbian 
government launched a new pseudo-campaign in September 2002, now under the slogan Proud for 
Serbia.  
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                   It is very simple to understand what happened in Serbia in the last two years. 
By getting a significant foreign aid, the DOS politicians simply avoided reforms, since 
reforms are costly. Anyway, politicians waited on first post-Milosevic elections in order 
to divide the cake. For that reason Djindjics government paid a lip service to reforms, 
and spoke about the government that has not alternative, while preserving status quo in 
reality and using foreign aid to make an impression that people live better.  
                   Provided the foreign aid was more moderate or conditioned, the authorities 
would be forced to think about reforms. By getting aid, they were able to keep a low 
profile in new legislation and to sell just three cement factories and few dozens of small 
enterprises. Authorities believed, a slow development in privatization should prevent a 
significant rise in unemployment. Such policies were short sighted, since donations and 
soft credits cannot last forever. The DOS government enters a scenario where the number 
of open questions and troubles grows instead to be smaller. Instead to await regular 
elections in 2004 after the most difficult reforms and post-reform recession are over, 
while the first positive results emerge, the authorities will face new elections with thin 
donations, not reformed real sector and rising tensions.  
                   Like all politicians not having real results, prime minister Djindjic and 
Serbian government suffer from pseudo PR campaigns, in an effort to promote allegedly 
results, which naturally do not exist in reality. In spring 2002 they started the campaign 
Serbia on the right path. Beyond the fact that something like that was unfounded, it 
turned out that the slogan itself was illegitimately136 taken from Scandiaconsult.  
                   Not reformed Serbia is exposed both to economic and political risks. 
Economic risk arises from non-reform environment. Current macroeconomic stability 
does not rest on real and stable ground. It is achieved without microeconomic 
stabilization, i.e. without transformation in the real sector. For that reason, 
microeconomic stabilization borrows from the macroeconomic one. This operation is 
very temporary, since macro-equilibrium is not based on micro-equilibrium. The former 
one is temporary financed through donations, soft loans and privatization revenues. A 
reduction from these sources will exercise pressure on macroeconomic level and cause a 
new equilibrium. That pressure will cause a crisis in Serbia in 2004-2006, comparable to 
that in Bulgaria from 1996.  
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                   Political risk includes bad political options that persist as political options for 
future, since there was no real reform to remove them. To put it the other way, the first 
function of reform would be to exclude bad political options, like communism and 
national-socialism. Another basic function of reforms would be, to provide better 
material and other environment for life. That would induce voters to accept changes, i.e. a 
market democracy under the rule of law. Since there were no serious reforms, bad 
conceptions are still eligible, with either elections or social unrest being catalytic.   
 
F. EXPECTATIONS  
 
                   Optimistic expectations about Serbia as a country of large chances, 
investment and significant prosperity will stay unfounded until it breaks up with 
socialism and etatism. However, there is a negligent probability for this to happen, since 
the majority of voters and all larger political parties are pervaded by the spirit of 
collectivism and regulation. It is much more probable that the current trend of extensive 
regulation, bureaucratic management of economy and high taxes will continue. For that 
reason Serbia in the long term will stay among two or three worst placed European 
transition countries.  
                   There will be no larger and significant legislative changes until the end of 
2002. It is expected a growth rate up to 2%, inflation rate of 16-20%, budgetary deficit of 
5-6% from GDP, trade deficit of some 73%, further rise in unemployment rate for at least 
10.000 jobs lost per month (with a slow rise in employment in private sector, able to wipe 
out some ¼ of those losing jobs). It is also expected a very slow devaluation of dinar, 
concerning hard currencies, and FDI's of up to 130m USD. Very similar results may be 
expected in 2003 too, with slightly lower inflation rate (up to 15%) and eventually larger 
unemployment rate. Beyond 2004, current temporary macroeconomic equilibrium is  
going to decay, caused by lower donations and privatization revenues. This trend may be 
speeded up, if the U.S. Congress blocks aid to Serbia, and if the U.S. starts to vote against 
Serbia in IMF, WB, etc.  
                   Thinking in the long term, Serbia will stay relatively stagnant country until 
2010, with an average growth rate of 2%, rather lower FDIs (they will move from 120m 
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to 300m USD per annum), and average inflation rate close to two digits. Large trade 
deficit will continue to exist at least until 2004-2006, and thereafter it will decline. 
Budgetary deficit will move 3-7%, and the largest will be in 2004-2006. This forcast 
allows fluctuations in some years, and it does not take into account eventual external 
shocks.  
                   The development described above may not be averted in any other way but 
through reorientation of public policies towards enthusiastic reforms, directed to the 
improvement of economic freedom and the rule of law. Specific content of this 
reorientation is contained bellow in «Recommendations». Relative succes depends on 
how deep, fast and sincere that eventual reorientation is going to be. For larger 
improvement and growth rates around 6-7%, it is necessary to improve the state of affairs 
in next to all relevant areas. Partial improvement or a very small improvement in all areas  
cannot create results significantly better from those envisaged in «Expectations».  
 
G. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
                   General recommendation for Serbia would be a fast and deep market reform, 
what is equivalent to quick and systematic leaving of collectivism and extensive planning 
and regulation. Steps in this direction include:  
- complete protection of private property and enforcement of private property 
rights;  
- full respect for freedom of contract;  
- legislation of new, liberal commercial laws;  
- radical simplification of procedures for start up businesses and operational 
conditions;  
- further liberalization of foreign trade, by reducing average tariff rate to 3% or 
lower, and removal of all formal and informal non-tariff barriers;  
- further liberalization of internal market by freeing all prices including utilities  
(after privatization);  
- fast privatization of all sectors, with special care for 100 or less largest 
enterprizes;  
- restitution of property nationalized by communists after the IIWW;  
- legislation of bankrupcy law, and enforcement of liquidation law;  
- new anti-monopoly legislation and its strict enforcement;  
- systematic stimulation of competition on the market;  
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- introduction of arbitrage councils for solving conflicts among firms in main 
branches; larger role for comercial courts, including shorter period for settling the 
cases;  
- introduction of euro (or dollar) as a paralel currency to dinar, and removal of all 
measures aiming to privilege the national currency;  
- removal of restrictive regulation of the banking sector, and complete liberalization 
of private and capital transactions in and outside the country;  
- liberalization of securities market, withdrawal of ban for Serbian citizens to buy 
foreign securities;  
- introduction of the simple and transparent tax system, with low and flat tax rates, 
without tax exemptions and special cases; introduction of the VAT of up to 10%, 
and reduction of the corporate tax and personal income tax to the level that is 
going to be competitive in the region;  
- reduction in state expenditures from 54% to less than 30% during several years;  
- decentralization of the country (larger responsibilities for municipalities, 
introduction of regions, authonomy for Vojvodina and Sandzak, etc.);  
- allowing fiscal federalism, i.e. tax competition among jurisdictions;  
- step by step legalization of gray economy by changing incentives rather than by 
power of law;  
- sincere, efficient and systematic fight against corruption and crime, based on the 
positive approach described above;  
- reform of the state administration, police and army, including tight civilian 
control over them;  
- strict respect of division of power, and full independence for judicial sistem;  
- reform of judicial system based on the rule of law;  
- removal of censorship and indirect control over media, privatization of state 
owned media (with exception of one radio and one TV channel);  
- liberation of NGO's and strict respect of demarcation lines between the state, 
private and NGO sector.  
 
Prosperity cannot be achieved by political means  it may result just from a huge rise 
in private investment. Serbia will not make economic advances without essential 
improvement in fostering individual freedom (including economic freedom), 
constitutionally very constrained government and the rule of law. The attractivity of 
these values will rise with the flow of time, both because the country has never tried 
that path and because it has tried dead ends  from tribalism and socialism, to self-
management, nationalism, and national conservatism. These policies brought huge 
costs and nearly no advantage. Naturally, changes in positive direction cannot happen 
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«Two Years of Reform in Serbia: A Wasted Opportunity» is in my opinion one of the 
best economic and political publications in post-Milosevic's Serbia. I believe this study 
represents not only an excellent criticism of economic policy from October 2000 to now, 
but also an important source of information for the citizens in Serbia about the gap that 
always exists in a paternalistic state between promises and reality. I would not be 
surprized if many members of the Serbian leadership pose the question, whether it is the 
right time to publish something like this. Socialist habits of avoiding the truth do not die 
easily. However, the principles of freedom require that the public is informed about 
discrepancies between promises and economic reality in Serbia. The insistance on truth in 
an environment that was fed by lies for more than six decades gives this study a great 
importance. For those reasons I welcome the publication of «Two Years of Reform in 
Serbia: A Wasted Opportunity». 
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